Case summaries

A decision by the State Secretary for Security and Justice (the “State Secretary”) of the Netherlands will be in violation of: (i) Article 3.37e of the Foreigners Regulation 2000 if such decision, regarding whether a country qualifies as a safe third country, is not based on several information sources; and/or, (ii) Articles 3.2 and 3.46 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the basis that all decisions of the State Secretary are required to (a) be carefully prepared and (b) include a decisive motivation.

The applicant appeals the decision to deny asylum and subsidiary protection, made on 26th August 2014 by the Ministry of Interior, on the grounds of fear of racial discrimination in his country of origin. The appeal is denied after an assessment of the facts and circumstances. 

In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.

The application was in three parts: the applicants asked the tribunal to annul the police commissioner’s decision on how the registration of asylum requests was carried out in Paris; to compel the police commissioner to re-examine the methods of registration; to fine the state €1500. The first two parts of the application were granted but the third was not. 

If a Member State is responsible for carrying out an asylum procedure under the relevant terms of the Dublin Regulation, e.g. under Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility if it has not been positively established that another Member State (which does not have responsibility) is willing to take charge of the applicant or take him or her back.

In such a case, it can be derived from the objective and purpose of the Dublin system, as well as the fact that it constitutes the procedural dimension of the substantive rights granted to applicants by Directive 2011/95/EU (i.e. Qualification Directive), that the individual concerned is entitled to have his asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State. This is so, irrespective of the question, whether the provisions on the Member State’s responsibility generally provide for subjective rights of the applicants. 

The case considered an appeal by the London Borough of Croydon (“Croydon”) to have Y’s claim for damages for wrongful detention stayed pending the resolution of Y’s challenge to the assessment of his age undertaken by Croydon.

The Appellant submitted that the judge erred in holding that the principles in Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 WLR 63 (“Starr”) did not apply to this case. The Respondent argued that the Starr principles could not apply to this case. The Court upheld Croydon’s appeal, holding that the order sought by Croydon was reasonably necessary to enable it to defend the challenge to its age assessment and that Y had unreasonably refused to give his consent to the different age assessments applied for by Croydon. 

The Italian consolidated Law on Migration (Art. 5(6) n. 286/1998) requires humanitarian protection to be given where a person is in a situation of vulnerability. Such a situation occurs when the applicant’s constitutional and international fundamental rights, such as health and nutrition, are compromised.

An Article 3 compliant assessment requires a full and ex nunc evaluation of a claim.  Where the State is made aware of facts that could expose an applicant to an individual risk of ill-treatment, regardless of whether the applicant chooses to rely on such facts, it is obliged to assess this risk ex proprio motu. 

A refusal to permit re-unification of family members with a child granted asylum in the United Kingdom can constitute a disproportionate breach of the right to respect for family life enjoyed by all family members under Article 8 ECHR despite the Immigration Rules not providing for family reunification where a child has been granted asylum in the UK.

The case dealt primarily with the standard of reasoning required in credibility assessment among other issues (travel findings and best interests of the child). In quashing the RAT decision, the High Court ruled that the RAT had not met the standard of reasoning required in assessment of the credibility of oral testimony (as established in the jurisprudence of the Court and EU law), reiterating the obligation upon the decision maker to ensure that each negative credibility finding is accompanied by an adequate rationale clearly outlining the reasons for such findings.