Case summaries

In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).

If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court. 

The French National Asylum Court (CNDA) must do a complete assessment of facts and circumstances in deciding whether an applicant should be granted refugee status, or failing that, subsidiary protection. In doing so, it must take into account all the documentation provided by the Applicant in support of the application. In this case, the Applicant’s medical evidence documentation and the evidence relating to the potential risks she is likely to face if she returns to her country (fear of persecution due to imputed political opinions) should have been taken into account.

The CNDA did not consider that evidence and did not include it in its decision.

The transfer of asylum seekers from Belgium to Austria, under the Dublin Regulation, is contrary to the principle of due diligence, because the government has failed to obtain information on the effects of the moratorium of the processing of asylum applications in Austria.

A Syrian asylum-seeker successfully challenges a negative asylum decision before the Swiss Federal Administrative Court because of violations of his right to be heard.

A decision by the State Secretary for Security and Justice (the “State Secretary”) of the Netherlands will be in violation of: (i) Article 3.37e of the Foreigners Regulation 2000 if such decision, regarding whether a country qualifies as a safe third country, is not based on several information sources; and/or, (ii) Articles 3.2 and 3.46 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the basis that all decisions of the State Secretary are required to (a) be carefully prepared and (b) include a decisive motivation.

The applicant appeals the decision to deny asylum and subsidiary protection, made on 26th August 2014 by the Ministry of Interior, on the grounds of fear of racial discrimination in his country of origin. The appeal is denied after an assessment of the facts and circumstances. 

In order for a correct application of the responsibility determination procedure under Dublin III to take place the applicant must be able to contest a transfer decision and invoke an infringement of the rule set out in subparagraph 19(2) DR III, i.e. where the applicant provides evidence that he/she has left the territory of one Member State, having made an application there, for at least three months and has made a new asylum application in another Member State.

The application was in three parts: the applicants asked the tribunal to annul the police commissioner’s decision on how the registration of asylum requests was carried out in Paris; to compel the police commissioner to re-examine the methods of registration; to fine the state €1500. The first two parts of the application were granted but the third was not. 

If a Member State is responsible for carrying out an asylum procedure under the relevant terms of the Dublin Regulation, e.g. under Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility if it has not been positively established that another Member State (which does not have responsibility) is willing to take charge of the applicant or take him or her back.

In such a case, it can be derived from the objective and purpose of the Dublin system, as well as the fact that it constitutes the procedural dimension of the substantive rights granted to applicants by Directive 2011/95/EU (i.e. Qualification Directive), that the individual concerned is entitled to have his asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State. This is so, irrespective of the question, whether the provisions on the Member State’s responsibility generally provide for subjective rights of the applicants. 

The case considered an appeal by the London Borough of Croydon (“Croydon”) to have Y’s claim for damages for wrongful detention stayed pending the resolution of Y’s challenge to the assessment of his age undertaken by Croydon.

The Appellant submitted that the judge erred in holding that the principles in Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 WLR 63 (“Starr”) did not apply to this case. The Respondent argued that the Starr principles could not apply to this case. The Court upheld Croydon’s appeal, holding that the order sought by Croydon was reasonably necessary to enable it to defend the challenge to its age assessment and that Y had unreasonably refused to give his consent to the different age assessments applied for by Croydon.