Case summaries

Political persecution can also exist when legally adopted criminal sanctions are imposed following standard legal proceedings against someone who has simply expressed political opinions. On the other hand, repressive measures with criminal sanctions against incitement to violence cannot be considered to be persecution.

This case concerned risk upon return to Iran in a situation where a person has previously been detained and tortured there and had supporting medical evidence. The Court found a violation of Art. 3 ECHR if the Applicant were to be deported to Iran.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) rejected an application for asylum and did not assess the risk of serious harm because the applicant was deemed not credible. The Metropolitan Court found this decision unlawful and ordered that the risk of serious harm be analysed in a new procedure. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Court found the assessment of non-refoulement unlawful, since all the available country information assessed concerned Serbia, however, the applicant's country of origin was Kosovo.

A single woman from Nigeria (Urhobo) was eligible for protection from deportation under Section 60 (7) sentence (1) of the Residence Act due to a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. The economic and social situation in Nigeria is difficult and tense even for the vast majority of the population. The situation is much worse for single women as women in Nigeria are exposed to multiple discrimination. To a large extent they are under legal incapacity, so that in practice they are only in a position to protect their own interests if they are supported by their family.

This case concerns the interpretation of Article 11 of the Qualification Directive when refugee status is deemed to have ceased to exist. The Court found this is when there has been change of circumstances which is significant and non-temporary and when there is no well-founded fear or other reason to risk being persecuted. States in assessing changes in circumstances must verify that the actors of protection have taken reasonable steps to prevent the persecution and that the person concerned has access to that protection. In making the assessment that there is no further risk the standard of probability used is the same that applied when refugee status was granted.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) to refuse to recommend refugee status on grounds of credibility. The refusal contained a finding which allowed an appeal on the papers only. The applicant sought to have this decision set aside by the High Court on the basis that an appeal without an oral hearing was insufficient as the report depended on a finding of a lack of credibility and thus required oral testimony to rebut this.

1. Refugee status was recognised because of a risk of persecution in case of return to Vietnam due to “exposed” political activities in exile.
2. Recognition as a refugee was not excluded by Section 28 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act. Contrary to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, political activities in exile do not constitute “circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision”  within the meaning of Art. 5.3 of the Qualification Directive , but fall under Art. 5.2. Therefore, Member States have no competence to regulate the meaning of such "activities" by applying Art 5.3. This is also demonstrated in the differentiation in Art. 4.3 (c) and (d). Art. 5 (2) of the Qualification Directive which essentially corresponds with the new Section 28 (1a) of the Asylum Procedure Act, although the term "activities" has not been adopted in the latter provision.

If an applicant raises circumstances that could present a potential breach of Art 3 ECHR it is impossible to reject the application as manifestly unfounded. The case must be considered on its merits and the deciding authority needs to have accurate COI.