Case summaries

According to the Supreme Court, the Defendant failed to provide the Plaintiff with the basic procedural guarantees that are guaranteed to an applicant for international protection in the safe third country procedure as stipulated by the International Protection Act (ZMZ), as well as the Procedures Directive. Neither the reasoning in the contested act nor any other data in the case files show that the Plaintiff was given the opportunity to argue that the Republic of Croatia is not a safe third country for him before the decision to reject his application was issued.

Whenthe Defendant handed over the Plaintiff to the Republic of Croatia without waiting for the decision as regards the Plaintiff's appeal and application for an interim injunction, the Defendant violated the Plaintiff's constitutional right to effective judicial protection and legal remedy as stipulated in articles 23 and 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.

This case concerned the disproportionate delay in processing the applicant’s claim for asylum on appeal. The applicant was informed that it would take eighteen months for his case to be heard. He lodged an appeal before the Constitutional Court (as a last resort) claiming the right to due process constitutionally guaranteed under Art 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution to enjoy legal process without undue delay.

Subsidiary protection can only be granted when the 1951 Refugee Convention is not applicable.

The case concerns an appeal lodged before the High Regional Court through the special procedure for Fundamental Rights (with the intervention of the Public Prosecutor). The applicant claimed asylum in Ceuta, Spain, and the application was accepted under the preliminary examination procedure. The applicant decided to move to the Spanish peninsula but he was prevented from crossing the border. He alleged that his right to free movement had been violated.

The case concerned a subsequent application for international protection based on the right to a family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) The application was rejected as inadmissible by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) on the basis that Art 8 considerations were deemed not applicable in asylum cases. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) made two important findings. Firstly it held that even if an application was considered to be inadmissible, there was an obligation to evaluate the risk of refoulement under Art 33 of 1951 Refugee Convention. Secondly, as provided by § 14(a)(2)(d) of the Asylum Act, in exceptional cases, to grant international protection for family life reasons, these have to be accepted as new elements in subsequent proceedings.

The failure to respect the procedural guarantees provided under Article 3.4 of the Dublin II Regulation constitutes a serious and manifestly illegal infringement of the right of asylum.

The petition for an ab initio examination of the asylum application was rejected by the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (decision being appealed in this case) because the evidence submitted was not deemed to be new and crucial. That ruling in the contested decision was flawed because the General Secretary did not have the authority to decide whether the Applicant had refugee status deeming the evidence submitted (a medical report which linked clinical findings to torture) to not be crucial for granting asylum. Instead, he should have ordered an ab initio examination of the asylum application, making the Administration comply with the relevant procedure. If, during that procedure, it was found that there was a legitimate case, then the Administration should have recognised the Applicant as a refugee.

The interview report established by an officer of a Prefecture is admissible evidence even if it has not been signed and was conducted without the assistance of an interpreter. When an asylum applicant denies having made statements recorded in that report, he must provide evidence. In this case, the applicant did not provide evidence that he had not crossed Italy and, in a written letter addressed to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, he even mentioned having crossed Italy.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the decision issued by the High National Court refusing refugee status. The applicant challenged the decision on the grounds that the right to legal assistance, representation and to the assistance of an interpreter had been violated.

The Migration Court of Appeal concluded that the Migration Court made an error in carrying out a credibility assessment before evaluating the evidence. The Migration Board and the Courts must first consider if an applicant was able to make his or her account plausible based on the evidence relied on, and only thereafter make a credibility assessment.

The Court emphasised that an applicant may have the advantage of the benefit of the doubt if his or her account appears credible. In this case, the applicant was deemed not credible and therefore the benefit of the doubt was not applied.

It is important to carefully distinguish between what constitutes evidence and information submitted by the applicant.