Case summaries

General situation in the country of origin, however difficult, does not justify granting refugee status, if there is no or only some small risk of persecutions (such risk can never be actually eliminated). However the authority is obliged to individually assess the situation of a particular applicant. This is not possible without careful examination of all the letters submitted by the applicant during the proceedings before the first and the second instance. Failure to do this cannot be validated by the Court by determining the facts on its own, since it would lead to de facto depriving the applicant of his right to have the case examined in two administrative instances.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court found that the conflict in Ukraine is not an armed conflict as defined in the provisions  relating to the grant of subsidiary protection. Even if the applicant was attacked by some persons he did not know, his obligation was to seek assistance in his country of origin, even if obtaining assistance would seem illusory and not realistic.

Granting refugee status is not justified by the living conditions or economic situation of the applicant, but only by the existing fear of persecutions in the country of origin. The state and regional authorities help internally displaced persons (IDPs) in organizing a new life undertake all efforts to ensure housing and assistance to IDPs from the southern and eastern part of the country in western and central Ukraine

An exclusion order was issued to the Applicant and therefore a measure within the meaning of the Returns Directive. Without undertaking an oral hearing, the appeals authority confirmed the issue of the exclusion order, but reduced its duration. In accordance with Art 47 Para. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the appeals authority was however obliged to undertake an oral hearing.

The fact that one of the grounds for requesting asylum was to legalise residency in the Czech Republic was not sufficient in itself to allow the application to be deemed unfounded.

The Ministry of Interior must address all factual statements made, even if not formally named as grounds for the asylum application.

The conditions for applying an exclusion clause can be fulfilled without considering if there are grounds for granting protection. 

A time limit of seven days to submit an appeal against the decision on a manifestly unfounded asylum claim is too short to ensure an effective remedy.

The Ministry of Interior is obliged to consider whether the conditions for granting subsidiary protection are fulfilled even when the application for international protection is dismissed as manifestly unfounded when it is clear that the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his or her removal, and if the applicant has failed without reasonable cause to make his or her application earlier, having had opportunity to do so.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 20(1)(d) and Article 20(2) of the Dublin Regulation and the analysis of time limits under these provisions when the Member State provides for suspensive effect of an appeal. The time limit for the period of implementation of the transfer begins to run, not as from the time of the provisional judicial decision suspending transfer but from the time of the judicial decision which rules on the merits of the procedure and which is no longer such as to prevent its implementation.

It is important to inquire whether there are elements relative to the situation of homosexuals in their country which enable them to be considered as forming a group whose members would face a risk of persecution, for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the authorities and society.

Examining the application as manifestly unfounded requires a three-stage test: (1) whether there is a risk of expulsion  abroad or extradition of the person, (2) whether the Applicant could have filed the application sooner, (3) whether it is obvious from the steps taken by the Applicant that they had filed the application with the sole intention of avoiding imminent expulsion or extradition.

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not have, for instance, extraterritorial effect in comparison with Articles 3 and 8 of the same Convention. The return of an individual to a country where he is threatened with constraints on his religious freedom, which do not reach the level of interference with his rights pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, is not in contradiction with the Convention. Such a return cannot even represent prima facie serious harm for the purpose of examining subsidiary protection.