Case summaries

The applicant, an ethnic Ingush and a Muslim from Ingushetia, Russia, feared her former husband and his family. She feared they would take her daughter away from her because she ran away with her child. Moreover, the applicant feared her eldest brother as he would marry her off to an elderly man and take her child away and hand the child over to her former husband.

The Refugee Appeals Board did not find that the conflicts between the applicant and her family members were of such nature and intensity to fall under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7. Consequently, the Board upheld the Danish Immigration Service’s decision to refuse the application.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

Where the ECtHR has, under Article 39 of the ECHR, granted interim measures prohibiting the Government from deporting the Applicant, this does not impact the ability of national courts to rule on the Applicant’s claim to asylum. The interim measures are binding on national authorities only.

Regarding family reunification, individuals can be considered as belonging to the same family if there is a clear economic dependency, not merely because they have biological ties. In order to establish this dependency, the judge may use both national and international sources. 

The applicant appealed against a deportation order on account of the high risk that he faced of being subject to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the case of return to Russia.

Arranging for medical or psychological examination is required, for example, when the third country national indicates that they were subject to violence, which left physical or mental signs which can be confirmed by medical or psychological examination. Not all invoked health problems will require an exam. Moreover, in subsequent proceedings this obligation is limited. The authority has no basis to arrange for such an examination when the event indicated in the subsequent application related to violence which was already subject to examination in the first asylum proceedings and was considered to not be credible.

The Supreme Administrative Count in the case concerning housing for a refugee ruled that the applicant, as a refugee, has found herself in a very specific situation, which was not taken into account by the authority. The applicant was not able to submit all the documents and information about the members of the family who stayed in Chechnya in order to obtain housing. It is beyond any doubt that the applicant and her children cannot live with their relatives, because other members of their family are in Chechnya, so the missing information could not have had any influence on the case whatsoever.

The Supreme Administrative Court found that it is the authority which is obliged to establish all the facts and find the objective truth. Although the local act imposes an obligation on the applicant to present concrete evidence, it cannot be stated, that justifiable problems with completing the evidence by the applicant exempted the authority from its own obligation to examine the case and enabled to automatically dismiss the application. Such an understanding would be inconsistent with article 6 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees.

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

The Court found a violation of Article 3 in relation to a subsequent application for asylum, which had been rejected on the basis that it contained no new elements indicating that the Applicants ran a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on deportation to Russia. Because new information had in fact been provided, the national authorities were under an obligation to thoroughly review the information in order to assure themselves that the Applicants’ rights under Article 3 would be safeguarded.

The extension of a transfer time limit in accordance with Article 20(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (“Dublin II”) does not create a new decision to transfer the Applicant to the responsible Member State, but has the effect of maintaining in force the initial transfer decision.

A judgment which cancels a detention measure based on Article L. 551-1 of the French Code for the Entry and Residence of Foreigners in France and of Asylum Right (“FCERFFAR”) on the grounds that the extension of the transfer time limit has not been notified to the Applicant in accordance with the formal requirements provided for in the initial decision to transfer, must be void.