Case summaries

Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.

The concept of a local conflict as referred to in Article 14 of Legislative Decree 251/2007 c) and which is a sufficient reason for granting subsidiary protection should not be understood as applying only to civil war. It should cover all circumstances where conflicts or outbreaks of violence, whatever their origins, between opposing groups or various factions appear to have become permanent and ongoing and widespread, not under the control of the state apparatus or actually benefiting from cultural and political ties with this apparatus.

This cases concerns the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive in a case where the two Applicants are Pakistani nationals who are members of the Ahmadi religious community and fear persecution there on the basis of religion.

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer an applicant to Hungary, when that applicant had first entered the EU through Greece. The argument that Greece’s formal responsibility for the applicant was “interrupted” by the applicant leaving the EU for a short term is contrary to Art 16(3) Dublin Regulation and must be dealt with by initiating procedures for a preliminary ruling at the CJEU. A preliminary ruling should also address the systemic failure of the asylum system in Greece, the risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR and whether this results in a different Member State being responsible for the asylum procedure.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer the applicant to Hungary on the ground that Hungary would transfer the applicant to Serbia, which would amount to indirect refoulement in violation of Article 3 ECHR. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and held that, although Hungary can be assumed as a safe country, if an applicant gives individual reasons for why Hungary is not safe these must be examined in detail. 

The applicant sought to rely on her Islamic proxy marriage to her husband, a recognised refugee in Ireland, to resist removal to the UK under the Dublin Regulations. Her application for judicial review failed as she was held to have forfeited her right under Article 7 of the Dublin II Regulation due to delay on her part in asserting that right.

The guidance in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database) should be applied, by analogy, in cases where the applicant feared persecution on account of their religion. Consequently, the Tribunal had to consider the reason why an Ahmadi applicant for asylum had modified his behaviour by preaching only to people who would not put him at risk of persecution.

Requiring a political activist to live away from his home area in order to avoid persecution at the hands of his political opponents has never been considered a proper application of the internal relocation principle. Indeed, the pitfalls of requiring a person to act contrary to his normal behaviour in order to avoid persecution have been further emphasised by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database).

In assessing state protection, a judge must look, notwithstanding a general sufficiency of protection in a country, to the individual circumstances of the applicant. In assessing whether an appellant’s individual circumstances give rise to a need for additional protection, account must be taken of past persecution (if any) so as to ensure the question posed is whether there are good reasons to consider that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) will not be repeated. When considering whether past persecution is a serious indication of a well founded fear under Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive, Recital 27 to the Directive indicated that the past ill treatment of family members was also relevant.