Case summaries

The Immigration Service refused an application for asylum deeming the application unfounded as the applicant had mainly based her claim for asylum on economic grounds. The applicant was taken into the System of Victim Assistance during the appeal stage on suspicion the applicant was a victim of trafficking. The Administrative Court held that in line with the Immigration Service’s decision, the application was deemed manifestly unfounded, but due to a suspicion the applicant was a victim of trafficking, returned the case to the Immigration Service for re-examination.

The existence of a risk of persecution in the country of origin should be assessed on the basis of information concerning the country of origin rather than on the basis of the credibility of the asylum seeker.

The applicant in this case claimed to fear persecution in Nigeria on account of his sexuality. A decision to affirm a deportation order against him was quashed on the basis that insufficient assessment was given to whether the applicant’s human rights would be infringed by the behaviour required of him in order to avoid persecution. The thrust of the refugee and subsidiary protection decisions in the case, and of the deportation decision, was that the applicant could hide his homosexuality and not therefore expose himself to persecution, prosecution or serious harm.  

The Migration Board accepted the applicant and her children were in need of international protection as refugees in relation to Senegal but claimed that they could obtain protection in Nigeria (considered a safe third country). The Migration Court upheld the applicant’s appeal stating that once a case has been examined in substance in relation to a country of origin and protection needs ascertained it is not possible subsequently to refuse protection by referring to a safe third country. Cases concerning safe third countries must be dismissed in accordance with Art 25.2(c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive which is transposed into Swedish law by the Aliens Act (2005:716) Chapter 5 Section 1 (b).

This applicant in this case was HIV positive. He was receiving treatment in Ireland while he was an asylum-seeker. Challenging a deportation order made against him, he claimed that he would be exposed to serious discrimination and stigmatisation in Nigeria and would have difficulty accessing treatment in public hospitals because of discriminatory attitudes of medical staff towards persons with HIV/AIDS.

The Court held that an inferior standard of medical treatment resulting from discriminatory attitudes towards a particular social group does not amount to persecution for a 1951 Refugee Convention reason unless it was associated with an unwillingness or inability on the part of the relevant authorities to protect members of the group from such ill-treatment.

The Court also found that it is only in exceptional cases that stigmatisation and discrimination on the part of even a large number of individuals constituted ill-treatment which comes within the scope of the prohibition in section 5 of the Refugee Act 1996 or the protection of Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and probably would require a minimum level of severity and clear evidence that the ill-treatment was so endemic and institutionalised as to raise a presumption that it was official policy or condoned by state authorities.

The withdrawal of practical protection against deportation for subsequent applications is lawful and does not represent an infringement of the right to an effective remedy (Art 13 ECHR), if the legality of the withdrawal is examined by the Asylum Court.

The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.

This case concerned the asserted right of an applicant to cross-examine the representative of the State who was presenting the State’s case on appeal to the Tribunal.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

The Refugee Appeals Tribunal had found that state protection was available to an applicant who claimed to have suffered many years of sexual abuse by her father and his associates in Nigeria. The High Court quashed the decision on the basis that, as the Tribunal decision had not made a clear finding as to credibility, it was not clear that the Tribunal had considered the personal circumstances and, in particular, the past persecution of the applicant in considering the availability of state protection.