Case summaries

It is the duty of the administrative authority to establish all of the facts that are important in a procedure, and thus to complete the background information for a decision to the extent that it forms a reliable basis for the decision-making itself.

The administrative authority is not relieved of this duty even with regard to the provisions of Section 34(3) of Act No 71/1967 Coll. on administrative procedure (hereinafter the “Administrative Procedure Code“), according to which the participants in a procedure must put forward the evidence that is known to them in support of their claims. 

Although the asylum seeker has been unable to offer any credible account of the death penalty allegedly imposed on him due to his homosexuality, it must nevertheless be assessed whether, he has grounds to fear persecution or is in real danger of suffering serious harm in his home country due to his sexual orientation, and what weight must be given to the fact that he must hide his homosexuality to avoid this kind of threat. The judgments of the Administrative Court and the Immigration Service were overturned and the case was returned to the Immigration Service for further consideration. 

1. If an Iranian national is declined the opportunity to obtain a school-leaving certificate and attend a state school because of the refusal by Iranian authorities to issue him with identity papers, this constitutes a significant discriminatory administrative measure according to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Qualification Directive.

 
2. The right to suitable education corresponding to a child’s abilities is recognised as a human right according to international law.

A Muslim asylum seeker and his/her spouse joined Jehovah’s Witnesses in Finland – a religious community.  In their home country, Iran, converting away from Islam can mean a death sentence.  The Administrative Court should not have been allowed to deny the application without an oral hearing in which further information could have been given regarding the Applicants’ conversion to Christianity and the consequences thereof in their home country.

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application. 

The case involved the rejection of an asylum application by an Iranian citizen of Kurdish origins who cited a fear of persecution because of his religious opinions and, specifically, having become a Christian. In support of his claims he submitted his baptism certificate and invoked the punishment stipulated by the legal system in his country of origin for changing his religion. The Minister for Public Order's decision on the party's application was annulled for being insufficiently reasoned.

The applicant, from Iran, had not been politically active in Iran but participated in demonstrations in Sweden and appeared with his photo on dissident websites and TV. The applicant was considered to have been engaged in low-level political activity. Thus, he was deemed not to be of interest to the Iranian authorities and was therefore not considered to be a refugee or in need of subsidiary protection on “sur place” grounds.

The Supreme Court does not consider an assessment of the Applicant as an untrustworthy person to be justifiable where it is based only on the fact that he failed to mention all of the details of the case immediately in the admission interview, providing them gradually instead, as the Applicant‘s claims are logical, consistent, and in line with the situation in the country of origin. The argument of untrustworthiness can be used only in situations where there are additional factors indicating that the facts asserted by the Applicant are not true, and that has not been demonstrated in the case in question.

This was an appeal against the rejection of an application for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 and 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010; and against the Minister for Citizen Protection's decisions 5401/3-498356 dated 11.2.2011 and 4000/1/67-f dated 18.5.2011. The rejection of the application (and the legal consequences arising from the rejection) was an excusable error, due to the body issuing the decision having adopted misguided practices. The fear of persecution was based on  membership of a particular social group. The domestic violence endured by the Applicant in the form of psychological stress and physical violence at the hands of her husband, in conjunction with the absence of State protection, constitutes a type of gender based persecution because those actions are detrimental to human dignity and physical integrity. Similarly, her non-conformist behaviour meant that she was exposed to the State's strict laws and practices which imposed disproportionately harsh punishment on women accused of having sexual relations outside marriage.

It was held that the implementation of laws (which may be derived from traditional or cultural norms and practices such as Sharia) which conflict with international human rights standards, and also the disproportionately harsh punishment imposed for non-compliance with a policy or for violation of a law (punishment, indeed, which shows gender based discrimination) could constitute persecution.

The imposition of corporal punishment by judicial and administrative authorities is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Applicant's disproportionately harsh punishment by whipping or even stoning is considered to be torture and constitutes a serious form of persecution since the right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is a protected right which is not subject to any exceptions. The prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture) is absolute, and a grave violation of absolute rights is, undeniably, persecution.

The importance of preserving family unity is emphasised, taking into consideration the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Preamble to Directive 2004/83/EC.

Restriction of the right to attend church is an act of persecution and therefore a violation of Art 10 of the Qualification Directive.