Case summaries

The Supreme Court quashed the detention and deportation warrants issued against a citizen from the Congo, following a number of prosedural failures by the Cypriot Government to comply with the Cap. 105 of the Alien and Migration Law and Directive 2008/115/EC, denying him the opportunity for voluntary departure.

On appeal to an Administrative Court, the burden of proof regarding the authenticity of newly presented evidence by a claimant to a Tribunal is on the adverse party, in the present case the Prefect.  A third country national can be returned to a country where he/she can be lawfully admitted. However, as provided by Article L.513-2 of the French Code on Entry of Foreigners and Right to Asylum,  a third country national cannot be returned to a country if the latter proves that his/her life or freedom would be threatened or he/she would be exposed treatments contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. 

This case examined the denial of a minor’s application for asylum which was decided primarily on the failure of his mother’s application. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal did not consider Country of Origin Information (COI) from the child’s perspective. Furthermore, clear reasons were not given for the refusal decision. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Refugee Appeals Tribunals decision to deny refugee status to the child. The Court also held that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration of the Tribunal both with regard to the procedure and substantive consideration of appeal. 

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Italy, on the grounds that the Prefect failed to demonstrate that Italy would have given the Applicant the relevant assurances as to appropriate reception conditions.

The court took into account the personal circumstances of the Applicant. The Tribunal found that the Prefect’s arguments were not adapted to the circumstances of the Applicant and were too general to demonstrate that transferring the Applicant to the Italian authorities would not have a substantial impact on the Applicant’s fundamental rights and the right of asylum in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”)  Dublin III Regulation.

In deciding extradition cases, the best interests of the child, although a primary consideration, could be outweighed by other interests, in this case effective immigration control. The impact of the family's extradition on the interests of the children was judged proportional, if weighed against the Zoumbas' appalling immigration record and the fact that the family could be removed without serious detriment to the children's well-being. Important guidelines were given for the decision of cases involving the welfare of children.

The Court refused to give two Applicants, who had both been granted asylum by the Czech Republic, permission to seek judicial review of the Refugee Applications Commissioner’s (ORAC) decisions not to admit their asylum claims for consideration on the basis of section 17(4) of the Refugee Act 1996, and also refused similar relief sought in respect of subsequent Deportation Orders, which it was claimed were unlawful owing to the unlawfulness of the former decisions regarding the Applicants’ asylum claims.

The relevant section precludes the Minister from granting a declaration of refugee status to persons who already have asylum pursuant to the Geneva Convention, and whose reason for seeking a declaration in Ireland does not relate to a fear of persecution in that state.

The Court held that they had not provided sufficient evidence that they had suffered or feared persecution for a Convention reason, and neither had they shown that they had taken any steps to avail of the protection of the laws or courts of the Czech Republic, nor provided a reasonable explanation as to why they did not do so.

Both Applicants were also formally refused an extension of time within which to bring their proceedings on the basis that (a) the criteria for the extension of time had not been met and (b) the substantive merits of their applications were insufficient to ground their applications seeking judicial review, even if they had been within time.

The ruling administrative body is obliged to try to make a decision within the time limit in international protection proceedings; an extension of the time limit must be duly justified and supported by the facts of the case. Absolute inactivity on the part of the ruling body cannot be justified by the instability of the situation in the country of origin or the complexity of the case.

Persecution at the hands of political authorities acting for political reasons and with a political objective although not arising from the actual or imputed opinions of the individual concerned.

A social group is not formed by those of whom it consists, or even by the objective existence of characteristics ascribed to them, but by the way in which surrounding society or institutions regard them. 

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".