Case summaries

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

These joint cases concern Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention. The Court considered what acts fall within the exclusion and what is meant by "serious reasons for considering" a person to be guilty of acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations (“UN”). 

In the context of the prediction of danger required for subsidiary protection, it is the actual target location to which the foreign national intends to return which is relevant in the case of a non-countrywide armed conflict. If the region of origin of the foreign national cannot be considered as a target location due to the danger presented there, he may only be referred to another region of the country according to the requirements of Article 8 of the Qualification Directive.

In this case the applicants argued unsuccessfully that the decision of the UK designated authority for determining asylum claims (the Secretary of State for the Home Department) regarding an applicant’s age should be accepted by other government bodies.

The case examined the allegations of five Afghan nationals that their detention conditions in Pagani detention centre were in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, that they did not have access to an effective remedy (Article 13) and that they were deprived of their liberty and security as well as of their right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided speedily by a Court (Article 5 para 4). 

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

The notion of “well-founded fear” has not been precisely defined. However, it is commonly accepted that it must necessarily contain two elements: a subjective element (the party has a real and credible fear of persecution) and an objective element (this fear has a basis in reality).  A person applying for refugee status should present facts and possibly evidence confirming that they were persecuted in the past or that they fear persecution upon returning to their country of origin. Other reasons for a foreigner leaving their country of origin or fearing a return to their country of origin are immaterial as regards recognition of their refugee status.

It is expected and necessary that persons fearing persecution should fully and continuously cooperate with the authorities handling their case.

Since the life, basic safety and livelihood chances of people are involved, based on the above described amount and nature of danger (in such cases naturally the actual danger need not and cannot be undoubtedly proved) the very likely occurrence of persecution, harm or other significant detriment cannot be risked.

In relation to the internal protection alternative, the Applicant must have family or kinship ties, or his/her basic livelihood and accommodation must be provided by other means in a certain part of the country.

Instead of rejecting the application, the Court granted subsidiary protection status to the single female Applicant and her minor children, as their return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (indiscriminate violence).

The age of the child and the mental state of the Applicant as well as the ban on more detailed questioning on the reasons for fleeing in the initial police interview should have been taken into account to a greater extent when assessing the assertion of flight. The lack of discussion of these aspects represents a failure to investigate several decisive points, which made the decision by the Asylum Court arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional