Case summaries

The removal of the author to Greece would amount to a breach of Articles 2 (c)-(f), 3, and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, because the Swiss authorities failed to consider her vulnerable status as a survivor of gender-based violence (GBV) and the real, personal, and foreseeable risk that the author would face as an unaccompanied victim of such violence and suffering from PTSD and depression.

The Committee, invoking the principle of non-refoulement and recognising gender-based violence as discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention, determined that removing the author to Greece would violate Articles 2 (c)-(f), 3, and 12 of the Convention due to the state party's failure to conduct an individualized, gender-sensitive, and trauma-informed assessment of the real and foreseeable risks the author faces as a woman experiencing gender-based violence.

The Human Rights Committee ruled that their treatment of asylum seekers detained on Christmas Island and later transferred to Nauru under Australia's offshore processing policy violated the ICCPR, due to arbitrary detention and cruel treatment. Australia was ordered to compensate the victims and reform its migration policies.

The Committee clarified that an assessment of article 3(2) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment requires an analysis of whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would be returned.

Moreover, when assessing an asylum claim, educational context, cultural context and mental welfare must be considered and where appropriate, expectations of the claimant’s ability to articulate and understand complex concepts readjusted. This is necessary to ensure the procedural safeguarding of the asylum application assessment process.

The Court found that there was a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR as State authorities used unreliable evidence to conclude their investigation into the death of an applicant. Moreover, the Court concluded that the State authorities violated Article 5 ECHR by failing to conduct an effective investigation into whether there was an alternative to detaining the applicants. As such, the detention of the children in a detention centre was further found to have violated Article 3, especially given the severity of the circumstances of the case and the period of their detention. The Court also concluded that the applicants had been subject to “expulsion” within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, since they were forcibly returned by the Croatian police outside official border crossings and without prior notification to the authorities of the country to which they were being returned.

With regard to the granting of subsidiary protection, the existence of real risks to the rights under Art. 2, 3 ECHR must be examined, which includes the obligation to consider ongoing developments on the basis of available information. If a deterioration of the security situation is disregarded, this could be seen as arbitrariness.

The Court decides that the relevant point in time to assess the ‘minor’ status of a beneficiary of international protection under the Qualification Directive is the date on which the applicant makes an (informal) application for international protection.

The Court decides that the notion of ‘family member’ under the Qualification Directive does not require an actual resumption of family life between the parent who benefited international protection and the child. Furthermore, the rights of a family member to claim the benefits under the Qualification Directive persist after the beneficiary of subsidiary protection reaches the age of majority, for the duration of the period of validity of the residence permit granted to them.

Sweden’s assessment as regards to the existence of real risk for the applicant suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and schizophrenia was arbitrary and a potential return to Afghanistan would violate the applicant’s rights under Article 15 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Article 40(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive does not distinguish between initial and subsequent applications for international protection. As such, Member States should not treat the assessment of evidence submitted in subsequent applications different from evidence submitted in a first application. Any document submitted by the applicant in support of his application for international protection must be considered, and the inability to authenticate that document cannot justify the exclusion of such a document from the examination.

The assessment of the existence of indiscriminate violence under Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may not be based exclusively on a quantitative assessment of casualties and population ratios. A comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case, and in particular those which characterise the situation of the applicant’s country of origin, is required.