Case summaries
In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal against a High Court Judgment in which the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was found to have erred in law in its approach to determining persecution. The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal on the basis that the tribunal member’s finding of no risk of persecution was not unreasonable (within the applicable standards of judicial review) and that the High Court was incorrect in finding that the extent of educational discrimination at issue in this case met the threshold of persecution required.
The Supreme Court granted the cassation complaint lodged by the Polish Ombudsman in the case of a persecuted journalist forced to leave the country together with her son and accused of deception in order to obtain attestation of false information (in a form of a visa issued by a Consul). The Supreme Court agreed that there was a reasonable doubt with regard to the circumstances of the case and the guilt of the defendant. In the view of the Court, even if the defendant acted in a way which could be defined as deception in order to obtain attestation of false information, the circumstances of the case, the statements of the defendant and her clarifications should lead to a question whether the defendant could have acted in a state of necessity (i.e. the sole means by which she could have safeguarded an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril was to sacrifice another interest of lesser importance) while leaving the country.
The following question is referred to the CJEU under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure:
Does Article 26 of the Dublin Regulation III prevent the competent authorities in a Member State, who have requested another Member State to take responsibility under a take back or take charge request of an applicant who has applied for international protection (which has not yet been ruled definitely upon) or any other person caught by Article 18(1)(c) or (d), from taking a transfer decision and notifying the applicant before the requested State has accepted the take back or take charge request?
The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively provide the Applicant the possibility to resolve contradictions in his statements, as required by Article 16 of the Recast Procedures Directive (RPD).
1. Do the ‘international obligations’, referred to in Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 1 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas cover all the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including, in particular, those guaranteed by Articles 4 and 18, and do they also cover obligations which bind the Member States, in the light of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees?
A. In view of the answer given to the first question, must Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas be interpreted as meaning that, subject to its discretion with regard to the circumstances of the case, a Member State to which an application for a visa with limited territorial validity has been made is required to issue the visa applied for, where a risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or another international obligation by which it is bound is detected?
B. Does the existence of links between the applicant and the Member State to which the visa application has been made (for example, family connections, host families, guarantors and sponsors) affect the answer to that question?
D.T., who possesses a leave to remain in Poland due to humanitarian considerations, appealed the Municipal Appeal Board’s decision to uphold the decision refusing to award her child benefits. Relying on a purposive interpretation of the applicable regulations regarding social welfare and the access of foreigners to the labour market, the Court decided to set aside both decisions, while stressing that the deciding body shall be bound by the legal analysis contained in the Court order.
Asylum authority’s decision regarding the application of the safe third country principle quashed. The Court pointed out that the application of the STC principle is ‘absolutely unacceptable.’
This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk.
The State Secretary for Security and Justice rejects an application for temporary asylum residence permits by two Syrian minors based on the finding that Lebanon is a Safe Third Country for the applicants. The Court of The Hague rules that the State Secretary failed to sufficiently motivate his decision, as article 3.106a(1)(e) of the Aliens Decree was not taken into account.
The Court found that the new DL 34/2008 in no way affects the legal regime established by the previous Law 27/2008, which secures the right to a legal procedure free of judicial costs in asylum claims. The Law 27/2008, altered by the new Law 26/2014, does not establish a cost exemption, which, if it did, would be then regulated by the DL 34/2008.