Case summaries
The petition for an ab initio examination of the asylum application was rejected by the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (decision being appealed in this case) because the evidence submitted was not deemed to be new and crucial. That ruling in the contested decision was flawed because the General Secretary did not have the authority to decide whether the Applicant had refugee status deeming the evidence submitted (a medical report which linked clinical findings to torture) to not be crucial for granting asylum. Instead, he should have ordered an ab initio examination of the asylum application, making the Administration comply with the relevant procedure. If, during that procedure, it was found that there was a legitimate case, then the Administration should have recognised the Applicant as a refugee.
It is lawful to refer an ethnic Armenian applicant from Chechnya to internal protection in other regions of the Russian Federation.
Asylum applicants who have already been subject to persecution also benefit from the facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive in the course of the examination of whether an internal protection alternative is available to them.
Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be engaged in suicide cases where the fear giving rise to the risk of suicide is not objectively well-founded.
The case concerned the inadmissibility of an application for international protection considering the Dublin II criteria and the validity of a visa.
This case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) refusing a claim for international protection from a Kosovan applicant who argued that his special skill as a kick boxer would place him within the meaning of a particular social group and that he should be afforded the protection within the Refugee Convention. It was found that the applicant did not belong to any particular social group and he could find protection in his country of origin.
The fact that Poland agreed to take charge of the asylum procedure of a whole family is, by itself, not a proper basis for an inadmissibility decision. The hierarchy of the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the procedure on the merits, set out in Art 5(1) Dublin II Regulation, must be respected. In this case the husband and father of the family had already been admitted to the procedure on the merits and, therefore, Art 8 was applicable prior to Art 14.
The CALL ruled that exclusion clauses are exceptional provisions with very serious consequences and should therefore be applied in a restrictive manner. There is a presumption of responsibility vis-à-vis persons holding high positions in a regime that is guilty of committing serious human rights violations, but such a presumption is refutable. It does not suffice to refer to the general situation in the country of origin at the time when the applicant held the position.
The situation which currently prevails in the Republic of Chechnya does not amount to generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal or international armed conflict.
The case concerns whether or not the accelerated procedure used in the applicant’s claim was consistent with Art 23.4 of the Asylum Procedures Directive which allows for an accelerated procedure. It was found that the accelerated procedure was consistent with the Asylum Procedures Directive because the applicant was found not to be credible.