Case summaries

The Court refused to give two Applicants, who had both been granted asylum by the Czech Republic, permission to seek judicial review of the Refugee Applications Commissioner’s (ORAC) decisions not to admit their asylum claims for consideration on the basis of section 17(4) of the Refugee Act 1996, and also refused similar relief sought in respect of subsequent Deportation Orders, which it was claimed were unlawful owing to the unlawfulness of the former decisions regarding the Applicants’ asylum claims.

The relevant section precludes the Minister from granting a declaration of refugee status to persons who already have asylum pursuant to the Geneva Convention, and whose reason for seeking a declaration in Ireland does not relate to a fear of persecution in that state.

The Court held that they had not provided sufficient evidence that they had suffered or feared persecution for a Convention reason, and neither had they shown that they had taken any steps to avail of the protection of the laws or courts of the Czech Republic, nor provided a reasonable explanation as to why they did not do so.

Both Applicants were also formally refused an extension of time within which to bring their proceedings on the basis that (a) the criteria for the extension of time had not been met and (b) the substantive merits of their applications were insufficient to ground their applications seeking judicial review, even if they had been within time.

Recalling the direct applicability of the Qualification Directive (Article 28, 29, recital 34), the Labour and Social Court of Vienna held that the refusal of a care allowance for beneficiaries of subsidary protection status was unlawful. The (minimum) core benefits to be granted to beneficiaries of subsidary protection status are to include at least support in the event of illness, whereby in accordance with Community law, the Austrian care allowance represented such support in the event of illness.

“The applicant bears the burden of the argument against the administrative authority, hereinafter referred to as the burden of proof. It is not, however, the duty of the asylum applicant to demonstrate his persecution by means other than his own credible testimony.”

“Where the testimony of an applicant for international protection submitted during proceedings can be identified as consistent and in accordance with the information available on the country of origin, in spite of minor inconsistencies, then such testimony must be relied on.”

A arrived in Finland via four transit countries using forged travel documents. When he/she was caught he/she applied for asylum in Finland. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that Article 31(3) of the Geneva Convention on Refugees prevented A from being persecuted for the crime of fraud.

This judgment overturned the decision of the Polish Refugee Board on examination of a manifestly unfounded application, on refusal to accord refugee status, provide subsidiary protection or grant a permit for tolerated stay, and on deportation from the Republic of Poland

In the proceedings, the foreigner stressed that he had left his country of origin as a child and currently has no family there, and that his entire family resides legally in Poland (they were granted a permit for tolerated stay in refugee proceedings). As the decision on refusal of protection is linked to the decision on deportation, refusal of protection would result in the Applicant being unable to see his family for many years. Therefore, in the Applicant’s opinion, the decision on deportation constituted interference in his family life, since it would result in him being separated from his family.

The Court found that the authority should properly examine and address the allegations made by the Applicant and thus consider the foreigner’s individual and family circumstances in the context of the possible application of Article 8 of the Convention, including the length of his stay in Poland, the possible obstacles to him living in his country of origin, and the likely effects on the Applicant’s family if the family was to be separated by the Applicant moving to another country.

Female genital mutilation constitutes an act of persecution relating to membership of a particular social group and, if it is established that such mutilation could specifically affect the  Applicant, constitutes a reason for granting refugee status under Article 2 and subsequent articles of Legislative Decree No 251 of 19.11.2007, implementing Directive 2004/83/EC.

A Gambian asylum seeker’s account of approximately eight years’ imprisonment and torture there was not considered credible. The Immigration Service and the Helsinki Supreme Administrative Courtconsidered the application to be manifestly unfounded and  the Supreme Administrative Court did not give leave to appeal on the matter. The UN Committee against Torture had, however, requested that the Applicant   not be returned to his home country, The Gambia, until UNCAT had examined the complaint. 

The ruling administrative body is obliged to try to make a decision within the time limit in international protection proceedings; an extension of the time limit must be duly justified and supported by the facts of the case. Absolute inactivity on the part of the ruling body cannot be justified by the instability of the situation in the country of origin or the complexity of the case.

In the present case certain formal conditions for dismissing the application through an accelerated procedure as defined in Article 54 of International Protection Act (ZMZ) were not taken into account. The Ministry of the Internal (MI) did not take a stance as regards the circumstances that the Applicant claimed as the grounds for leaving his country of origin and applying for international protection.

Once the Applicant states in his application for international protection that his human rights and fundamental freedoms would be violated if he was returned to the recipient country (in this case Bulgaria) in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, the Respondentmust verify whether any systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions constitute reasonable grounds for believing that the Applicant would be exposed to a real danger of inhuman and degrading treatment in the sense of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.