Case summaries

The Migration Board accepted the applicant and her children were in need of international protection as refugees in relation to Senegal but claimed that they could obtain protection in Nigeria (considered a safe third country). The Migration Court upheld the applicant’s appeal stating that once a case has been examined in substance in relation to a country of origin and protection needs ascertained it is not possible subsequently to refuse protection by referring to a safe third country. Cases concerning safe third countries must be dismissed in accordance with Art 25.2(c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive which is transposed into Swedish law by the Aliens Act (2005:716) Chapter 5 Section 1 (b).

The applicant sought asylum in Spain claiming to have suffered persecution in Bangladesh on the grounds of membership of a group (the Beharies) determined by its ethnic identity. This persecution intensified when the war with Pakistan broke out. The Ministry of Interior refused the application which was appealed by the applicant to the High National Court. This court examined if persecution under the 1951 Refugee Convention could be established, beyond a case of discrimination.

The situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict ended after the victory of the Sri Lankan army over the LTTE in May 2009. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant belonged to the Tamil community was not sufficient to justify his fears of persecution considering the situation which prevails in Sri Lanka, which cannot be seen as characterising a situation in which the destruction of a specific ethnic group is pursued, since the civilians of Tamil origin are not targeted for persecution by the governmental authorities solely for reason of their ethnic origin.

Even if it is assumed that an internal armed conflict is taking place, a serious individual risk can only be established if the degree of indiscriminate violence which is characteristic of the conflict has reached such a high level that any civilian is at risk of a serious individual threat simply by his or her presence in the region.

The suicide attacks and bombings typical of Iraq and also of the hometown of the applicants can be classified as acts of indiscriminate violence. However, a density of danger as it is necessary for the assumption of a serious and individual risk cannot be established. Nor do the applicants possess individual characteristics which result in an increased risk for them when compared to other members of the civilian population.

The case concerns an appeal lodged before the High Regional Court through the special procedure for Fundamental Rights (with the intervention of the Public Prosecutor). The applicant claimed asylum in Ceuta, Spain, and the application was accepted under the preliminary examination procedure. The applicant decided to move to the Spanish peninsula but he was prevented from crossing the border. He alleged that his right to free movement had been violated.

Chechens, who do not have particular characteristics putting them at risk, are not at risk of persecution in the Russian Federation due to their membership of their ethnic group. Therefore it can basically be assumed that other parts of the Russian Federation provide an internal protection alternative.

If necessary medicines are not accessible through legal means in the country of origin adequate care is not available. 

Subsidiary protection was granted on grounds that the applicant, from Iran, could be at risk inhuman or degrading treatment. The applicant based his asylum claim on the political activities of his brother in his country of asylum, as well as his own participation in protests in Iran. The Court found that after having spent two years in Finland as an asylum seeker it was likely that the applicant would be of special interest to the Iranian authorities.

This decision concerns an appeal lodged before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court, confirming the Ministry of Interior’s decision to revoke the refugee status of the appellant and her children. This revocation was issued following the voluntary return of the applicant’s husband to Colombia, his country of origin.