Case summaries
The non-suspensive effect of a decision not to further examine a subsequent application under Article 32 of the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive is not in violation of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter since the decision’s enforcement will not lead to the applicant being removed and is therefore unlikely to expose the applicant to a risk of inhumane treatment.
The contested judgment is unconstitutional as it does not provide a clear way of assessing the jurisdiction of the third country when dealing with the application. It also reveals that the situation of the Applicant for international protection is unclear in the event that the application is rejected by the third country and the Applicant is not allowed to enter its territory, and shows that it is unclear as to what the Applicant can contest in this procedure.
An efficient legal system that would stop the extradition to a country in which the Applicant could be exposed to inhuman treatment has to have suspensive effect.
When rejecting an application for international protection under the safe third country concept, Article 27 (2) (a) of the Procedures Directive needs to be taken into account. According to this article, the "connection" between the Applicant and the safe third country needs to be ascertained during the process.
The High Court held that in a case where a negative recommendation in a first instance application for asylum was based exclusively or primarily upon a finding of a personal lack of credibility, there is an obligation to allow an oral appeal in order to provide an "effective remedy," in the sense of Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, notwithstanding that the Applicant is from a “safe country” and the legislation allows for limiting an Applicant to a written appeal only in those circumstances. For the same reasons, to allow an oral appeal is also required by the right to fair procedures contained in Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.
This case concerned the right to an effective remedy; the Court considered that the remedy of judicial review in Irish law is an effective remedy within the meaning of Art 39.1 of the Procedures Directive.
The right to an effective remedy under EU law does not require the specific preliminary decision to place an applicant for international protection under the accelerated procedure to be itself subject to judicial review, provided that this decision is reviewable as part of judicial consideration of the final substantive decision to grant or refuse protection.
Requiring a political activist to live away from his home area in order to avoid persecution at the hands of his political opponents has never been considered a proper application of the internal relocation principle. Indeed, the pitfalls of requiring a person to act contrary to his normal behaviour in order to avoid persecution have been further emphasised by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database).
This case involved a challenge to the transposition of the Procedures Directive into Irish domestic law which appeared to be barred by a special time limitation period of 14 days applicable to challenges to asylum/deportation decisions. The Court found that a Member State is entitled to apply a national limitation period even in respect of those cases where the Member State in question has failed properly to transpose the relevant Directive, provided that the limitation period complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The Court found that the strict 14 day time limit provided for in section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act, 2000, is not equivalent to the limitation period for judicial reviews in other broadly similar areas (generally 6 months) and is not effective because it is so short a time. In the circumstances, the limitation period could not be pleaded or relied upon against the applicants.