Case summaries

The UNHCR Handbook is an important source of law concerning the procedure to determine protection needs. The Migration Court is responsible for ensuring that a case is sufficiently investigated by holding an oral hearing or otherwise investigating the ambiguities of the case, when an asylum seeker who has been rejected because of credibility grounds has submitted relevant documents that are deemed to be genuine by a Swedish embassy.

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide protection in respect of claims of conscientious objectors who feared imprisonment for their refusal to undertake military service where there is no alternative service offered in national law. This was the position even if that objection is to all forms of military service and is absolute. The right to conscientious objection was not yet protected in international human rights law and was yet to emerge as a principle of customary international law. A claim may succeed if the applicant would be required, in the course of military service, to conduct military action that breached the basic rules of human conduct or if the punishment they would receive for refusal to serve was discriminatory or disproportionate. Secondly, when assessing whether persecution was “for” a Convention reason the decision-maker should ask the question of “what was the real reason for the persecution?”. The decision-maker should not limit the enquiry to the persecutor’s motivation but should look for the effective reason or reasons.

When assessing an application for refugee status, what is important is whether the acts of persecution were carried out for the reasons identified in the Geneva Convention, and not whether or to what extent the victim of persecution can be identified with those reasons.

Fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention need not mean that persecution is certain or even probable. Recognition of refugee status is already justified where there are reasonable grounds for asserting the possibility of persecution. “Possibility” means that persecution may take place although it is neither certain nor probable, and the “reasonable grounds” requirement indicates the need to establish real and objective evidence of the risk of persecution. The plausibility of the threat is shown by the situation in the country of origin of the person applying for refugee status as well as that person’s experience to date.

One cannot demand recognition of refugee status pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention where protection can be provided pursuant to Article 1D of the Convention. The phrase used in the first sentence of Article 1D of the Convention – “persons who are at present receiving… protection or assistance” – relates to those Palestinians who could avail themselves of protection on the date of the Convention, i.e., on 28 July 1951., and to their direct descendants born after that date, provided they remain under the mandate of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). “Protection or assistance” for Palestinians is provided solely in areas under the UNRWA mandate. Therefore, exclusions from protection under the Geneva Convention relate only to those Palestinians who reside permanently in those areas.

In assessing claims based on political opinion, a broad approach needed to be adopted to ensure that the object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention was met.  Political opinion could be actual or imputed and had to be assessed in the context of the society that the applicant had fled.  Political opinion should not be restricted to issues relating to party politics nor, in the context of persecution non-state actors of persecution, was it helpful to identify those who were on the side of the forces of “law and order”.

In cases where the applicant fears persecution from non-state actors, the home state can be judged to provide protection if it has in place a system of domestic protection machinery for the detection, prosecution and punishment of such acts, and has an ability and readiness to operate the machinery.  Where the line is drawn will depend on the facts of the case.

The issue of an applicant’s nationality is integral to a claim for refugee status. In the great majority of asylum applications the nationality of the applicant is not in issue, but when it is put in doubt decision-makers must address it. Failure to do so would offend the nationality logic that underlies the refugee definition set out in Art 1A(2). The burden of proof in respect of nationality is on the applicant although the evidential burden may shift.

In assessing whether a state is a safe third country with regard to its interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was not sufficient to assess whether the foreign state’s interpretation of the Convention was reasonable. The Secretary of State for the Home Department had to be satisfied that the foreign state applied the one true interpretation of the Convention decided upon by the UK Courts.