Case summaries
A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.
Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations.
The Federal Administrative Court has to clarify whether the petition for action directed solely at the obligation to decide on the asylum application is admissible. The question if it is also possible to directly oblige the defendant to grant international protection or to establish prohibitions on deportation by means of an action is not the subject of the decision. As a result, the court comes to the conclusion that there was a delay by the respondent of providing the decision on the asylum application without sufficient reason and that the plaintiff has a need for legal protection for its action for failure to act.
The case deals with the illegitimacy of denying the registration of an international protection request on the basis of the request being issued before a non-competent authority and lacking the criterion of “autonomous accommodation”.
Member States can issue a return decision together with, or right after, a negative decision on an asylum application at first instance, as long as they ensure that all judicial effects of the return decision are suspended during the time allowed to appeal and pending that appeal.
During that period, and despite being subjected to a return decision, an asylum applicant must enjoy all the rights under the Reception Conditions Directive. The applicant can rely upon any changes in circumstances affecting his claim that came up after the return decision, before the appeals authority.
The possibility to lodge an asylum application in practice is a prerequisite for the effective protection of those in need of international protection. If access to the asylum procedure is not guaranteed by the national authorities, asylum applicants cannot benefit from the guarantees afforded to those under the asylum procedure, leaving them subject to detention at any time. The length of time in which it took for the applicant to lodge his asylum application violated his rights under Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR.
If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant a further opportunity to be heard.
However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.
The Tribunal reasserted the decision maker’s duty of confidentiality in considering documents produced in support of a protection claim. Where there is a needed to make an inquiry in the country of origin then written consent must be given by the applicant. Moreover, Article 22 of the Asylum Procedures Directive prohibits direct contact with the alleged actor of persecution. Additionally, the Refugee Convention requires that the authentication of a document is undertaken with a precautionary approach, namely whether an inquiry is necessary or should be framed in a specific manner and whether there is a safer alternative. Ultimately, disclosure of personal information should go no further than is strictly necessary.
The Tribunal found that the respondent was unlikely to have breached confidentiality in her inquiries into the authenticity of the documents produced; and that if she had, the remedy would not be the grant of refugee status; and that the appellant had not established that he had a credible case for asylum on the basis of the documents submitted. Nonetheless the Tribunal highlighted that a failure to comply with the duty of confidentiality might be relevant to the overall assessment of risk on return.
The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.
A grave psychological disease (post-traumatic stress disorder – PTSd) is a reason to grant interim legal protection against deportation, if the applicant is in a state of self-endangerment or potentially suicidal in case of a deportation.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.