Case summaries
The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.
The Syrian family's application for a Humanitarian Visa at the Belgian embassy in Lebanon fell outside the scope of the Visa Code, even if formally submitted on the basis of its Article 25(1)(a), because the purpose of the application (that is, to apply for asylum upon arrival to Belgium) differs from that of a short-term visa.
Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.
If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.
It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.
Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.
After having committed several offences qualified as being of a ‘particular gravity’, Mr.O’s refugee status was revoked on April 21st 2006.
Upon appeal to the Council of Alien Law Litigation (‘CALL’), the question of the validity of article 55/3/1 of December 15th 1980 law (the ‘1980 Law’) arose. Although it is established that this provision is transposing article 14(4) of the Directive 2011/95/EU, its compatibility with the Geneva Convention must be verified.
The Council refuses then to pronounce itself on the question, arguing the competency of such matter is vested in the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The ECtHR ruled that the border-control procedure to which three Eritrean nationals were submitted did not provide adequate safeguards capable of protecting them from arbitrary removal. The applicants were on board a vessel docked in an Ukrainian port and were only allowed to disembark after the ECtHR indicated interim measures for that purpose. Therefore, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 13 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR.
1. Do the ‘international obligations’, referred to in Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 1 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas cover all the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including, in particular, those guaranteed by Articles 4 and 18, and do they also cover obligations which bind the Member States, in the light of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees?
A. In view of the answer given to the first question, must Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas be interpreted as meaning that, subject to its discretion with regard to the circumstances of the case, a Member State to which an application for a visa with limited territorial validity has been made is required to issue the visa applied for, where a risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or another international obligation by which it is bound is detected?
B. Does the existence of links between the applicant and the Member State to which the visa application has been made (for example, family connections, host families, guarantors and sponsors) affect the answer to that question?
The Court of Appeal rejected a request rebutting the presumption of Turkey as a safe third country for a Syrian national of Armenian origin who resided there for one year and held a work permit, on the ground that general references to human rights violations and deficiencies in Turkey’s asylum system did not suffice to establish a real and individualised risk of persecution or indirect refoulement to Syria.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.
The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran. However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR.