Case summaries
Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 5 of the German Act of the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory (Residence Act) does not comply with the requirements in Art. 2(n) Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 which defines ‘risk of absconding’ as the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined by law. Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 5 of the Residence Act names ‘risk of absconding’ as a reason for detention but lacks the required objective criteria to determine the existence of the ‘risk of absconding’. Therefore according to the current legal situation in Germany detention in order to ensure the transfer as per Art. 28 Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 cannot be based on the detention reason ‘risk of absconding’.
The detention reasons named in Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 2 and No. 3 of the Residence Act comply with the requirements in Art. 2(n) Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013. Detention in order to ensure the transfer as per Art. 28 Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 can be based on these provisions.
The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.
The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.
The contested judgment is unconstitutional as it does not provide a clear way of assessing the jurisdiction of the third country when dealing with the application. It also reveals that the situation of the Applicant for international protection is unclear in the event that the application is rejected by the third country and the Applicant is not allowed to enter its territory, and shows that it is unclear as to what the Applicant can contest in this procedure.
An efficient legal system that would stop the extradition to a country in which the Applicant could be exposed to inhuman treatment has to have suspensive effect.
A stateless Palestinian woman from Syria who was registered with the UNRWA but who was no longer receiving support from the organisation was granted refugee status by the Migration Court of Appeal, and the case was returned to the Swedish Migration Board for re-examination of the period of validity of the residence permit.
A bad situation in the country of origin does not constitute a sufficient intrinsic reason to accord refugee status or other forms of protection.
One cannot question the credibility of an applicant solely on the basis of a discrepancy between the information stated in the application and the information provided in subsequent stages of the proceedings.
The right to pocket money for an asylum seeker whose placement in a private address is permitted by the Migration Office because of justified reasons is part of the right to dignity. Legislation depriving a person of this right is not in line with the Constitution.
Rules on rights of applicants for international protection (Governmental Decree, Official Gazette no.64/14) determining that financial aid for asylum seekers placed in a private address is to be decreased by 50% might endanger the applicant’s right to human dignity.
In this case the applicants argued unsuccessfully that the decision of the UK designated authority for determining asylum claims (the Secretary of State for the Home Department) regarding an applicant’s age should be accepted by other government bodies.