Case summaries
In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.
Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.
When analysing if protection from UNRWA has ceased (Article 12(1)(a) Directive 2011/95), account must be taken of the possibility for the individual to concretely access effective protection in any of the other fields within UNRWA area of operations.
Assistance from the Agency must be considered as maintained when an individual has left UNRWA area of operations from a field where he couldn’t obtain effective protection, if the person had previously voluntarily left a field where he could access UNRWA’s assistance, even though he could reasonably foresee, according to the information available for him at the moment of departure, that he wouldn’t be able to receive effective protection from the Agency in the field he was travelling to, or return to the field of origin in the short term.
In a case of an asylum application on the grounds of gender based persecution, supported by medical reports, the Belgian Council of State held that it belongs to the asylum authorities to investigate the origin of injuries, whose nature and seriousness imply a presumption of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR and to assess the risks they reveal.
Without this assessment, the judge cannot legally conclude that the Applicant does not establish that he has been persecuted or has suffered serious harm or been subjected to direct threats of such persecution or harm.
Article 21(2) of the directive precludes Member States from issuing a measure of refoulement or expulsion against the persons covered by one of the scenarios described in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 if this would expose the concerned persons to the risk of their fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.
The CJEU ruled on whether an individual could appeal a decision which refused refugee status but granted subsidiary protection status, even if the rights and benefits afforded by each international protection status are identical in national law.
An asylum applicant who was a victim of previous persecution in their country of origin can be granted refugee status under article 1, C 5) of the Geneva Convention. This is because, due to the severity of the treatment applied, the applicant’s fear is exacerbated to such an extent that, even if the persecution has ceased to exist, a return to the country of origin would be unthinkable.
Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.
It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.
In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.
Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.