Case summaries
The fact that an asylum applicant has already been persecuted in the past or has already suffered serious harm is a serious indication of the well-founded fear of the claimant, or of the real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there is good reason to believe that this persecution or serious harm will not happen again.
When an applicant has suffered female genital mutilation in her country of origin, there is a rebuttable presumption that she will again be the victim of such persecution because of her membership in the social group of Ivorian women.
In order to guarantee that an applicant for international protection has an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, a national court or tribunal is required to vary a decision of the first-instance determining body that does not comply with its previous judgment. The court or tribunal must substitute its own decision on the application for international protection by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.
Article 21(2) of the directive precludes Member States from issuing a measure of refoulement or expulsion against the persons covered by one of the scenarios described in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 if this would expose the concerned persons to the risk of their fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.
The ECtHR ruled that failure to allow a Russian family with five children to submit asylum applications on the Lithuanian border and their removal to Belarus amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
Persons entitled to refugee protection should be accorded the same treatment regarding assistance as provided to nationals of the Member State. Article 29 Directive 2011/95 and Article 23 Geneva Convention do not make this treatment dependant on the length of the applicant’s stay in the Member State.
A refugee may rely on the incompatibility of legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, with Article 29(1) of Directive 2011/95 before the national courts in order to remove the restriction on his rights provided for by that legislation.
The CJEU ruled on whether an individual could appeal a decision which refused refugee status but granted subsidiary protection status, even if the rights and benefits afforded by each international protection status are identical in national law.
CJEU rules on the correct processing of applications for international protection lodged separately by family members and the interrelationship between them.
CJEU rules that Hungarian national law which defines ‘serious crime’ (in the context of exclusion from subsidiary protection) as a crime with a possible custodial of 5 years sentence as incompatible with the Qualification Directive. Instead, each crime must be looked at on an individual basis to ascertain its “seriousness”.
Where a person is registered with UNRWA and then later applies for international protection in a European Union Member State such persons are in principle excluded from refugee status in the European Union unless it becomes evident, on the basis of an individualised assessment of all relevant evidence, that their personal safety is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions are compatible with its mission and that due to these circumstances the individual has been forced to leave the UNRWA area of operations.
The fact that a person cannot be repatriated under Article 3 of the ECHR does not imply that that person should be granted a leave to reside in the host country by way of subsidiary protection under Directive 2004/83. The person concerned is eligible for subsidiary protection only if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate health care.