Case summaries

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

Persecution at the hands of political authorities acting for political reasons and with a political objective although not arising from the actual or imputed opinions of the individual concerned.

The appeal authority is obliged to assess the case on the basis of all the evidence and to provide proper grounds for its decision. It is not sufficient, therefore, to state in general terms that the second-instance authority shares the position of the head of the Polish Office for Foreigners and the arguments put forward by him. If the principle of two-instance administrative proceedings is to be observed, it is not enough to assert that two decisions by two authorities of different rank were issued in the given case.

The CALL held that the fact the Applicant had already suffered very severe genital mutilation (type III – infibulation) was a serious indicator of a well-founded fear of persecution due to her membership of a particular social group. 

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

This cases concerns the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive in a case where the two Applicants are Pakistani nationals who are members of the Ahmadi religious community and fear persecution there on the basis of religion.

The situation in Somalia, in particular in the South and Central regions, should be regarded as a situation of generalised violence resulting from an internal armed conflict.  

A social group is not formed by those of whom it consists, or even by the objective existence of characteristics ascribed to them, but by the way in which surrounding society or institutions regard them. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

Instead of rejecting the application, the Court granted subsidiary protection status to the single female Applicant and her minor children, as their return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (indiscriminate violence).