Case summaries
A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.
The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.
The presence of laws criminalising homosexuality does not amount to persecution within the meaning of article 9, Directive 2011/95/EU when there is no real risk for gay men to be prosecuted on the basis of these laws. A gay man in Algeria may reasonably be expected to relocate within the country in order to avoid persecution from his family members, and to conceal his sexual identity so as to conform to societal pressures falling short of acts of persecution.
A person, with a well-founded fear, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, of being harmed by their family if they return to their country of origin because they are a member of a particular social group and are unable to rely on effective protection from the state, may be entitled to claim refugee status.
Termination of an applicant’s international protection status (ie where there is a change or termination of protection grounds) must be examined against the principle of non-refoulement, which ensures the right to a fair and efficient procedure in which the Asylum authority assesses if non-refoulement would be violated where protection ceases.
It results from the principle of non-refoulement that the applicant in proceedings on termination of subsidiary protection must have the possibility to state all the reasons for which subsidiary protection should not cease.
In the process of renewal of subsidiary protection all the guarantees provided by Article 18 of the Constitution (Prohibition of Torture) should be respected.
Legislation which limited the assessment of the competent authority in the subsidiary protection renewal procedure only to the grounds based on which an individual has been granted subsidiary protection, is inconsistent with the right set out in Article 18 of the Constitution.
The risk of persecutions should be assessed only on the basis of the current state of affairs or a prognosis of the situation in the foreseeable future, based on documented facts and not on general hypothesis regarding potential changes with no probability assessment. There is no doubt that in Ukraine there is a serious crisis, because of armed conflict in the part of the country, but for now there is no real risk that the conflict will cover the whole country.
The applicant is a member of a protestant church, while the dominating religion is orthodox. This circumstance should be duly taken into account when applying the internal protection alternative. The analysis whether the applicant’s fear of persecutions is well founded, should be based on updated information. The information was not updated since it came from April 2014 and the decision was taken in December 2014. The situation in Ukraine is dynamic so the appeal authority should complement the case files accordingly.
Whilst the Appeals Committee believes that the applicant was ‘wronged’ during the administrative procedures in the First and Second Degree (pursuant to Decree 113/2013), the Committee is unable to request a new personal interview, because no such provision exists within the national legislation (Regulation Service of Authority and Appeal 339/2013 opinion of the Legal Council).
The obligations imposed by Article 3 ECHR do not prevent contracting states from taking into account the possibility of relocation. Where appropriate, contracting states can expect an applicant to relocate to another part of his country of origin in order to avoid persecution.
The statement that the applicant can relocate within his country of origin is based solely on general information on Ukraine, without paying attention to his personal circumstances and conditions in the places he could be expected to settle in.
In the decision there is no reference to the applicant’s age, occupation, family situation, employment and housing opportunities, as well as his registration and the level of assistance he could benefit from if returned. The burden of proof to show that the personal circumstances of the applicant are not sufficient to counter a refusal of international protection on the basis of the internal protection alternative lies with the State authority.
The main question is whether the applicant can be sure that he will obtain assistance allowing for certain standards of living. The state assistance is significant here, as the applicant has no family or friends in the part of the country of origin under control of Ukrainians.
General situation in the country of origin, however difficult, does not justify granting refugee status, if there is no or only some small risk of persecutions (such risk can never be actually eliminated). However the authority is obliged to individually assess the situation of a particular applicant. This is not possible without careful examination of all the letters submitted by the applicant during the proceedings before the first and the second instance. Failure to do this cannot be validated by the Court by determining the facts on its own, since it would lead to de facto depriving the applicant of his right to have the case examined in two administrative instances.
The Court expressed doubts as to whether it is constitutionally permissible to base the withdrawal of subsidiary protection on a “final conviction of a crime” without taking the circumstances of the individual case into account. The Austrian provision might not be in line with the requirements as set out by the European Union Directive 2004/83/EC and might therefore be unconstitutional.