Case summaries
As an extraneous consideration, the Coronavirus pandemic does not justify the suspension of the implementation of Dublin transfer decisions. The de facto suspension of Dublin transfers due to the Coronavirus pandemic does not interrupt the time limit for the implementation of Dublin transfer decisions.
A change of the Member State responsible based on the expiration of the time limit for transfer does not depend on the accountability of the requesting Member State for the impossibility to carry out the transfer.
The Dublin transfers, which have been suspended indefinitely due to the so-called Corona pandemic, constitute a domestic-related obstacle to execution in the sense of an objective impossibility which leads to a temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung) in accordance with § 60a para. 2 sentence 1 AufenthG.
The suspension constitutes a subsequent change in circumstances leading to the order of suspensive effect pursuant to § 80 para. 7 VwGO.
In view of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Swiss authorities should obtain formal and detailed guarantees on care and accommodation from the Italian authorities before transferring families and vulnerable persons to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation.
This is because Decree-law 113/218 on Public safety and Immigration in Italy has deeply reformed the Italian refugee reception system.
The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) must carry out an individualised examination to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the asylum procedure of the Member State where the applicant shall be transferred to has systemic weaknesses that would entail a risk of inhuman treatment or chain deportation.
The transfer of a family to the previous country of entry (Bulgaria), which might entail the risk of refoulement to the country of origin (Afghanistan), would cause an irreversible and serious harm; it ordered the suspension of the transfer decision until the final decision, on the annulment of the rejection of the application on the refugee status, was issued.
The Court decides that Greece is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s claim for international protection. The Court does not find that asylum procedures in Greece are flawed and that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman and degrading reception conditions. Moreover, neither the fact that the applicant’s sister is living in Germany nor the purpose of medical and psychological support in a Member State entitles the applicant under the Dublin Regulation to choose which country will examine his application for international protection.
The notification about the intention of withdrawal from the EU by the Member-State responsible for the examination of the application for international protection does not trigger the determining Member-State’s obligation to make use of the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) 604/2013 EU. Similarly, Article 6 (1) cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the Member State that is not responsible to take into account the best interests of the child and to examine the application itself under 17 (1)
The extension of the transfer period in accordance with Art. 29 para. 2 sentence 2 Dublin Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation) requires that the asylum applicant absconds, which has to be proven by the transferring authority.
Absconding is only the case, if the asylum applicant cannot be reached by the competent authorities for an (undefined) longer period of time. The intention to evade the authorities does not have to be proven. The circumstances of the individual case are decisive.
Article 8 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides for a subjective right to family reunification, both for the applicant himself and for the family members present in the Member State responsible. This right is also justiciable to the extent that denial of transfer affects the rights to family unity and the best interest of an unaccompanied minor.
The expiry of the time limit for the submission of a take charge request pursuant to Article 21 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation, as well as for the submission of a request to review the rejection of a take charge request (so-called "remonstration") pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Implementing Regulation to the Dublin II Regulation, does not reverse the responsibility back to the requesting Member State if the failure to comply with the time limit cannot be attributed to the applicant and family unity and the best interests of the child take precedence over the procedural rules on time limits.
Due to the paramount importance of the right to family unit and the best interests of the child, the discretion under Article 17(2) of the Dublin III Regulation translates into a legal obligation of the Member State to invoke the sovereignty clause where there are close family ties. Beyond such family ties, no further special relationship or interdependency is required.
Whether a minor is "unaccompanied" within the meaning of Article 2 lit. j of the Dublin III Regulation depends on the domestic law in the Member State where the minor is present.
The CJEU ruled on the time limit for Member States to respond to requests for re-examination of "take charge" or "take back" requests and clarified that Member States should endeavour to respond within two weeks; if they do not the requesting Member State retains responsibility.