Case summaries

Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for international protection may rely, in the context of an action brought against a decision to transfer him, on the expiry of a period laid down in Article 21(1) of that regulation, even if the requested Member State is willing to take charge of that applicant.

The two-month period for submitting a take charge request where there has been a Eurodac hit is not cumulative with the general three-month period for take charge requests.

An application for international protection is deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared by a public authority and certifying that a third-country national has requested international protection, has reached the authority responsible for implementing the obligations arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the main information contained in such a document, but not that document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority.

If the applicant comes from a “safe” country, they must be able to prove that there is no protection as understood in the 1951 Geneva Convention, otherwise his application will be rejected. 

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

Where an asylum application is made by an unaccompanied child, the tribunal must take into consideration the best interests of the child in its examination (for example, education). The decision includes a presumption of minority that the tribunal must rebut in order to allow for the transfer of the applicant. 

Wishing to challenge his transfer to Germany from Luxembourg, the applicant appealed this decision and the court found that, on the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, all individuals had a right to contest the manner in which the Dublin III criteria are applied. 

On the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, the administrative tribunal found that all asylum applicants have a right to appeal the manner in which the responsibility criteria of Dublin III has been applied to their individual case and the determination of a responsible Member State where there are systemic deficiencies. 

The following question is referred to the CJEU under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure:

Does Article 26 of the Dublin Regulation III prevent the competent authorities in a Member State, who have requested another Member State to take responsibility under a take back or take charge request of an applicant who has applied for international protection (which has not yet been ruled definitely upon) or any other person caught by Article 18(1)(c) or (d), from taking a transfer decision and notifying the applicant before the requested State has accepted the take back or take charge request?

The ECtHR ruled that the Greek authorities had failed in their positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR to guarantee that the applicant’s asylum request is examined within a reasonable time in order to ensure that his situation of insecurity, which impinges upon several elements of his private life, is as short-lived as possible. 

Hungary does not guarantee the respect of asylum procedures. The transfer must be halted in accordance with article 3 of the Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013.

The judgment’s motivation must be based on more than one source if others are available.