Case summaries

The UK Secretary of State for the Home Department’s (SSHD) refusal to accede to a take charge request of a stateless wife and her child in Greece wishing to reunite with their British husband/father in the UK is a breach of Article 7 Charter/8 ECHR (and Article 6(1) of the HRA 1998) on the basis that the SSHD’s decisions were disproportionate and not justified. Notwithstanding that the husband/father is a British citizen, the Dublin Regulation applies, notably Articles 9 and 17(2). In respect of Article 9 Dublin Regulation III, it can be relied upon even where an individual in receipt of international protection subsequently naturalises as a British citizen. 

An internal armed conflict, characterised by armed clashes, prevails throughout the whole territory of Afghanistan. The situation in the Kabul region and the city itself constitutes indiscriminate violence resulting from this internal armed conflict.

Transferring a family to Finland under the Dublin Regulation where their asylum application and subsequent appeals have been rejected is unlawful on account of the humanitarian and security situation in Afghanistan. 

The authorities followed an incorrect interpretation of the Dublin Regulation 604/2013 failing to take into account that the older applicant is the brother of the minor and should remain in Hungary under Article 10 of the Regulation, despite having lodged an application in Bulgaria.

The Federal Administrative Court changed its jurisprudence concerning those competence provisions of the Dublin-III-Regulation that can be challenged with a complaint against a decision not to take charge. The Court follows the approach taken by the CJEU in Ghezelbash (C-63/15) and Mengesteab (C-670/16) and allows complaints based on missing the term to request another Member State to take charge (Article 21(1) Dublin-III-Regulation). If successful, the Member State responsible for requesting to take charge will, itself, be in charge to deal with the asylum application.

The Court also held that notifications by the Swiss Ministry for Migration (SEM) stating that the Dublin-procedure has been terminated are considered to be interim acts that can be reviewed until the closing of the complete procedure, if the acting authority provides objective grounds and acts in respect of the principle of good faith.

The Refugee Appeals Board reversed the Danish Immigration Service decision to Dublin Transfer a female asylum seeker and her two minor children to Italy. The Board found that a transfer to Italy could amount to a breach of Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as reception conditions in Italy are subject to certain shortcomings and the asylum seeker and her two minor children were considered to be extremely vulnerable. 

The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary ruling:

(i) when dealing with transfer of a protection applicant under regulation 604/2013 to the UK, is a national decision-maker, in considering any issues arising in relation to the discretion under art. 17 and/or any issues of protection of fundamental rights in the UK, required to disregard circumstances as they stand at the time of such consideration in relation to the proposed withdrawal of the UK from the EU;

(ii) does the concept of the “determining member state” in regulation 614/2013 include the role of the member state in exercising the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iii) do the functions of a member state under art. 6 of regulation 604/2013 include the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iv) does the concept of an effective remedy apply to a first instance decision under art. 17 of regulation 604/2013 such that an appeal or equivalent remedy must be made available against such a decision and/or such that national legislation providing for an appellate procedure against a first instance decision under the regulation should be construed as encompassing an appeal from a decision under art. 17;

(v) does art. 20(3) of regulation 604/2013 have the effect that in the absence of any evidence to displace a presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to treat his or her situation as indissociable from that of the parents, the national decision maker is not required to consider such best interests separately from the parents as a discrete issue or as a starting point for consideration of whether the transfer should be take place.

When a Dublin transfer does not take place within the six-month time limit prescribed in the Dublin III Regulation, responsibility for examining the application for international protection is automatically shifted to the Member State that requested the Dublin transfer. Moreover, the Court extends the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided in the Dublin III Regulation, specifying that an applicant for international protection can challenge a Dublin transfer before a national court by invoking the expiry of the prescribed six-month time limit.

Sending countries are under the obligation not to transfer any individual to another country if any reasonable doubt regarding systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State arises. The mere assumption that the country will comply with its obligations under international and European law is not sufficient and the sending country is under the obligation to comply with the precautionary principle and not allow the transfer.

Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for international protection may rely, in the context of an action brought against a decision to transfer him, on the expiry of a period laid down in Article 21(1) of that regulation, even if the requested Member State is willing to take charge of that applicant.

The two-month period for submitting a take charge request where there has been a Eurodac hit is not cumulative with the general three-month period for take charge requests.

An application for international protection is deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared by a public authority and certifying that a third-country national has requested international protection, has reached the authority responsible for implementing the obligations arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the main information contained in such a document, but not that document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority.