Case summaries

A third-country national whose entry was tolerated by the authorities of one Member State faced with the arrival of an unusually large number of third-country nationals seeking transit through that Member State in order to lodge an application for international protection in another Member State, without fulfilling the entry conditions generally imposed in the first Member State, must be regarded as having ‘irregularly crossed’ the border of the first Member State within the meaning of that provision. Article 13(1) of the Dublin Regulation III therefore applies and Croatia is deemed to be responsible for the protection claims. 

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

Request to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the following issues: Procedural delay, jurisdiction and living conditions under the Dublin Regulation. 

In its decision, the tribunal defined the concept of ‘written’ according to the Dublin III Regulation. It also found that the a couple who were engaged did not constitute a family (according to the Regulation) unless they got engaged in their country of origin. Finally, the tribunal found that the sovereignty clause only afforded power to the State which was exercising it under the supervision of the administrative judge. 

An application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 cannot be considered inadmissible because subsidiary protection has already been granted by another Member State (if the protection applied for is more favourable than the existing protection). The assessment of the admissibility of an application for asylum filed prior to 20 July 2015 is subject to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions adopted pursuant to the now superseded Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2005/85/EU) which provided for inadmissibility of an application for asylum if refugee status had already been granted by another Member State. 

The Slovenian legislature has not fulfilled its obligations under the provisions of Article 2(n) of the Dublin Regulation. The possibility of an analogous application of Article 68 of the Aliens Act-2 has a very weak basis in terms of the objective criteria required. It can only be sufficient in a particular case if in light of the specific circumstances of the case there is no doubt about the existence of the risk of absconding.

The applicant’s asylum application was rejected in Croatia and he received an order to leave the country in 30 days. The Slovenian Asylum authority detained the applicant due to the risk of absconding, because he left Croatia before receiving a decision in his asylum procedure. The Court ruled that the applicant’s departure from Croatia was incorrectly assessed as arbitrary absconding (the applicant actually respected the order to leave the country) and therefore the applicant does not present a risk of absconding. The Court also held that the measure was not necessary, that the Asylum authority incorrectly referred to its discretionary powers in this matter and that the objective criteria to determine when someone presents the risk of absconding (from Article 68 of Aliens Act-2) have not been applied.

The Constitutional Court rules that the doubts of the Federal Administrative Court about the legality of Section 9a(4) and Section 21(9) FPG-DVO as amended by BGBl. II 143/2015, which defines the term “risk of absconding” in the context of detention pending deportation pursuant to Section 76 FPG, are unfounded. The Court finds that Section 9a(4) FPG-DVO was adopted on a sufficient legal basis. 

Art 20 (3) of the Dublin III Regulation is no longer applicable when a minor subsequently enters another member state after the application for international protection of his/ her relative is completed.