Case summaries
The ban on the introduction of new matters in appeal proceedings as stipulated in the Asylum Act does not violate the right of access to the courts contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as it represents a proportional restriction.
The case examines the allegations of an Afghan national that the extension of his detention for an additional two months had been unlawful and contrary to Article 5(1) of the Convention and that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy for the review of his detention in violation of Article 5(4) ECHR.
The forced return of a Coptic Christian to Egypt would expose him to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, but the processing of his asylum application through the fast-track procedure was not a violation Article 13 due to the almost 3 year delay in claiming asylum.
A person in detention pending deportation has a fundamental right to receive visitors -including visits from journalists -and inhibiting this visiting right for the person in detention can be challenged by way of appeal to the Independent Administrative Senate. A journalist, on the other hand, who has been refused a visit to someone in deportation detention, does not have a right of appeal, amongst other things, because the information which could be provided by the person in deportation detentionis not publicly accessible and there is thus no state obligation under Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to facilitate access to this information by granting a visit to the person in deportation detention.
This case concerned an application for a licence for a civil marriage with a Greek citizen where there was an inability to provide a certificate of being unmarried or a birth certificate because of disrupted relationship with homeland and in the context of the submission of a sworn statement regarding the absence of any impediment to marriage. The case considered the balance between the safeguards of family law and a State's obligation to protect the fundamental rights of refugees. Under the principle of proportionality, the private and family life of the individual is inviolable, bearing in mind that the lack of evidence of being unmarried should not prevent the him from being granted a licence to enter into a civil marriage with his partner, the mother of their two minor children which he has already voluntarily recognised. It is possible to substitute in concreto the said evidence with a simple sworn statement and, therefore, the Applicant does satisfy the legal requirements for the granting of a marriage licence.
This inadmissibility decision concerned the transfer of Mrs. Hussein and her children to Italy from the Netherlands under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court found the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 ECHR and Article 13 ECHR as manifestly unfounded within the meaning of Article 35(3)(a) of the Convention. The Court found that though there were shortcomings in Italy it did not disclose systemic failures to provide support for asylum seekers there.
Referring specifically to the asylum procedures directive, the Council of State examines the external and internal legality of the French list of safe countries of origin and decides to take Bangladesh off the list.
The case concerns the removal of a Brazilian national residing in French Guiana (a French overseas département-région) and his inability to challenge the measure before its enforcement.
The option for the CNDA to determine certain cases without involving a collegiate decision was consistent with French, European and International law and the Applicant did not need to be notified of the intention to use this procedure.
The case examined the allegations of five Afghan nationals that their detention conditions in Pagani detention centre were in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, that they did not have access to an effective remedy (Article 13) and that they were deprived of their liberty and security as well as of their right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided speedily by a Court (Article 5 para 4).