Case summaries

Judicial review to challenge the failure/refusal of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SoS”) to determine the application of the applicant’s spouse and two youngest children for family reunification in the UK on the following grounds: a failure to apply the SoS published policy; irrationality; breach of all the family members’ rights under Art. 8 ECHR; and (regarding the two children in the UK), breach of the duties owed under s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”).

The Upper Tribunal found that:

1) the Home Office family reunification policy embraces a series of flexible possibilities for proof of identity;

2) the reunion applications were not examined and determined which involves a public law misdemeanour within the applicant’s grounds for challenge; and

3) in any case where withdrawal or a consent order is proposed judicial scrutiny and adjudication are required.

Article 17 forms an integral part of the Dublin Regulation and should be applied in a manner which furthers the aims and objectives of the Regulation in general. Article 17 is a justiciable right and should be particularly relied upon in circumstances where one of the overarching values of the Dublin Regulation, namely expedition, is not being fulfilled in the procedures of the host Member State. Article 17 is not subject to a prior assessment of non-satisfaction of Article 8 (family reunification) of that same Regulation.

Applicants who engaged with Dublin authorities should be subjected to less onerous standards when assessing the success of an Article 8 ECHR claim.

The UK Upper Tribunal held that there had been a failure of the Secretary of State to lawfully exercise the discretion conferred by Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation and ordered the Secretary of State to admit the applicant to the UK, based on: (1) the deficiencies of the Italian asylum system in the present case, namely the lack of sufficient expedition to register the asylum application and initiate Dublin proceedings; (2) the deficiencies and delay in the guardianship system in Italy; (3) the expected lengthy procedures for a “take charge” request and subsequent Dublin transfer; (4) the need to take into account the best interests of children.

Analysing the legality of the refusal to grant child benefit payments to parents who are not habitually resident within the State for the benefit of their children.

Article 3 ECHR is triggered in cases involving the removal of a seriously ill individual where the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, exposes the individual to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

Access to sufficient and appropriate medical care must be available in reality, not merely in theory and the impact of removal on an applicant must be assessed by considering how an applicant’s condition would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.

This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk. 

The ECtHR ruled that the Greek authorities had failed in their positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR to guarantee that the applicant’s asylum request is examined within a reasonable time in order to ensure that his situation of insecurity, which impinges upon several elements of his private life, is as short-lived as possible. 

A general circular letter send by Italian authorities is not a sufficient individual guarantee regarding a Dublin Transfer of a man suffering from various serious diseases.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

Regarding the protection of the right to family life in asylum procedures, same-sex partnerships are in a comparable situation with heterosexual relationships. A distinction between the applicants for international protection based on sexual orientation is not in compliance with the Constitution. Article 16b(1) of IPA, which does not consider persons of a same-sex living in established partnership as family members, is inconsistent with the right to non-discriminatory treatment in the exercise of the right to family life.

The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were applying for leave to remain in Sweden due to affiliation with their husband and father respectively who had permanent residency in Sweden. The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were all granted evidentiary relief regarding their identities. Further, one of the Applicant’s children, a 20 year old daughter, was deemed to fulfil the criteria for household community and special dependency. The Applicant and all of the Applicant’s children were granted leave to remain.