Case summaries

This case concerned the risk of violation of Article 3 for the proposed deportation to Iraq of a single female who was a member of the Mandaean religious minority.

 In its previous judgment the Court had found that there would be no violation, provided that the applicant was returned to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The case was struck out unanimously by the Grand Chamber pursuant to Article 37 § 1 ECHR given that the applicant had been granted a permanent residence permit in Sweden. 

The physical border around the enclave of Melilla is conformed by two fences and the intermediate zone created between them. The Spanish military police (Guardia Civil) considers that until a migrant has not overcome the second fence he or she has not entered into Spanish territory and therefore, Spanish law, including the Organic Act 4/2000 on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (“Aliens Act”), does not apply to a migrant apprehended in the intermediate zone.

The Court ruled that, although this interpretation may violate international law, since there is no clear definition under Spanish law of where the border is located, the direct refusal of migrants who have reached the intermediate zone, does not constitute an administrative prevarication offence. 

The European Court of Human Rights has held that the detention conditions on the island of Chios, the detention centre of Tychero and the north of Greece, where a minor Palestinian was held, were not in breach of article 3 of the Convention.

In addition, the Court did not accept that the applicant’s right to liberty and security (article 5) and right to an effective remedy (article 13) had been violated.

The Act on International Protection (AIP) does not provide for a legal basis to deprive an asylum applicant of their liberty (which is the case when the applicant is placed in a closed centre for irregular migrants, termed the “Centre for Foreigners”), but only for the restriction of movement (which can be the case when the movement is restricted to the area of the reception centre for asylum seekers).

An excessive length of the procedure (in this case 2 years and 5 months) for examining the jurisdiction for the application for international protection, which is not caused by the protection seeker himself, leads to an obligation of the Member State to decide the case itself (“duty of self-entry”). Thus this Member State has jurisdiction for the application for international protection to guarantee a fast and efficient procedure within the Dublin III-Regulation.

The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal  (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.

The case examined the allegations of an Iranian national that his detention conditions at the border posts of Feres and Soufli resulted in a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment). It further examined whether the applicant’s living conditions after his release resulted in degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. 

This case examines the refusal to grant international protection status to a physically disabled, single Egyptian woman. The OIN failed to provide clear, detailed reasoning why the Applicant did not meet the legal conditions to acquire subsidiary protection status in Hungary.

The Metropolitan Court of Public Administration and Labour granted subsidiary protection status to the Applicant and concluded that based on cumulative grounds the Applicant would be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she returned to Egypt.

In this judgement, the Court held that there was a violation of article 3 of the Convention concerning the detention conditions of the applicant at the premises of the executive subcommittee of the Thessaloniki foreign police. There was also a violation of article 5 para 1 (f) concerning the duration of his detention and para 4 with regards to the judicial review of his detention. 

The Court found that there would be no violation of Article 3 in the event of return of the applicant, who suffered from chronic kidney failure and was in need of dialysis three times per week, to Kyrgyzstan.