Case summaries

The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal  (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.

The case examined the allegations of an Iranian national that his detention conditions at the border posts of Feres and Soufli resulted in a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment). It further examined whether the applicant’s living conditions after his release resulted in degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. 

This case examines the refusal to grant international protection status to a physically disabled, single Egyptian woman. The OIN failed to provide clear, detailed reasoning why the Applicant did not meet the legal conditions to acquire subsidiary protection status in Hungary.

The Metropolitan Court of Public Administration and Labour granted subsidiary protection status to the Applicant and concluded that based on cumulative grounds the Applicant would be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she returned to Egypt.

In this judgement, the Court held that there was a violation of article 3 of the Convention concerning the detention conditions of the applicant at the premises of the executive subcommittee of the Thessaloniki foreign police. There was also a violation of article 5 para 1 (f) concerning the duration of his detention and para 4 with regards to the judicial review of his detention. 

The Court found that there would be no violation of Article 3 in the event of return of the applicant, who suffered from chronic kidney failure and was in need of dialysis three times per week, to Kyrgyzstan.

The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.  

The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.  

The Supreme Court held that the National High Court of Spain (Audiencia Nacional) erred in annulling the General Deputy Director of Asylum’s decision to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection because the National High Court of Spain failed to consider the substance of the Appellant’s request for asylum.

The Supreme Court declared that the National High Court erred when annulling the decision of the General Sub-Directorate for Asylum (Ministry of Interior) to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection. The National High Court annulled the decision but did not consider the Appellant’s core claim: the request for international protection.

As the National High Court was in possession of all necessary facts required to decide on the substance of the request by the Appellant for international protection, it should have been able to determine as such. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal.

Even after the introduction of Art. 3 (3) AsylG, the previous legal practice with regard to persons who justify their asylum application by refusing military service or desertion in their home country continues to be valid. Accordingly, a conscientious objection to military service or desertion cannot establish refugee status on its own, only if it is associated with persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG.

The case concerns an expulsion order from Romanian territory issued against a Turkish applicant, and his placement in an administrative detention centre

The Court found that there was no violation of article 5(4) ECHR as the applicant had been given the opportunity to challenge the legality of his detention

However, it found that article 5(1)f) ECHR had been violated as the applicant had been detained for a further three months after the rejection of his asylum claim.