Case summaries

The Royal Decree of 11th May 2015 was quashed to the extent that it included Albania in the list of "safe" countries for the purposes of article 57/6/1, paragraph 4, of the law of 15th December 1980.

Regarding the protection of the right to family life in asylum procedures, same-sex partnerships are in a comparable situation with heterosexual relationships. A distinction between the applicants for international protection based on sexual orientation is not in compliance with the Constitution. Article 16b(1) of IPA, which does not consider persons of a same-sex living in established partnership as family members, is inconsistent with the right to non-discriminatory treatment in the exercise of the right to family life.

The Constitutional Court rules that the doubts of the Federal Administrative Court about the legality of Section 9a(4) and Section 21(9) FPG-DVO as amended by BGBl. II 143/2015, which defines the term “risk of absconding” in the context of detention pending deportation pursuant to Section 76 FPG, are unfounded. The Court finds that Section 9a(4) FPG-DVO was adopted on a sufficient legal basis. 

The return of a third country national woman or girl to a country where female genital mutilation is traditionally practised is not a breach of Art. 3 of the Convention where her family (including her possible husband) has the will and the possibility to ensure that she will not be subjected to that practice. 

The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were applying for leave to remain in Sweden due to affiliation with their husband and father respectively who had permanent residency in Sweden. The Applicant and the Applicant’s children were all granted evidentiary relief regarding their identities. Further, one of the Applicant’s children, a 20 year old daughter, was deemed to fulfil the criteria for household community and special dependency. The Applicant and all of the Applicant’s children were granted leave to remain. 

The applicant challenged the Belgian Minister of Asylum and Migration’s decision not to grant him a humanitarian visa via an emergency application before the CALL. He relied on the following grounds: inter alia, (i) his medical condition and (ii) the poor living conditions of the West Bank in Palestine.

The CALL decided (i) these two elements justified an urgent decision, (ii) there was a risk of serious prejudice which would be difficult to remedy if the Minister’s decision was enforced, and (iii) there were serious grounds for invalidating the Minister’s decision since denying a visa to the applicant was likely to constitute a breach of art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), thus fulfilling the three conditions under art. 39/82 of the Belgian Aliens Law 15-12-1980. 

Art 20 (3) of the Dublin III Regulation is no longer applicable when a minor subsequently enters another member state after the application for international protection of his/ her relative is completed.

Any deprivation of liberty must fall within the exceptions set out in Art. 5 of the Convention, and must be lawful, namely in compliance with domestic law, and free from arbitrariness. For this latter purpose, domestic law must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application.

After a certain time of mere waiting for the detainee’s cooperation, detention ceases to be genuinely imposed for the purpose of detention, in accordance with art. 5.1(f) of the Convention. 

This case is concerned with whether the State Secretary for Security and Justice correctly argued that the medical report did not prevent the removal of an asylum seeker who was HIV positive.  

The Council of State of the Netherlands ruled that the State Secretary could not have relied on the medical report. Hence, the State Secretary failed to sufficiently investigate whether the applicant would find herself in a life threatening situation when ordered to leave the territory of the Netherlands.  

The detention of a Somalian national is declared by the European Court of Human Rights to constitute a violation of Articles 3, 5 (4) and 5 (1). The cumulative effects of the detention conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and the detention could not be deemed lawful due to the lack of an effective remedy during detention and insufficient justification under Article 5 (1) (f).