Case summaries

This was an appeal against a decision to expel a widowed illiterate mother and five of her children who had been granted subsidiary protection in Bulgaria. Austria did not have to apply the sovereignty clause, as the situation in Bulgaria did not give rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR. Although the applicant’s sixth child had entered Austria and applied for asylum as an unaccompanied minor two years earlier, there was no violation of Art 8 ECHR because family reunification was possible in Bulgaria and there is no family life worth protecting.

During the refugee status proceedings, the administrative authorities should clarify on what grounds a foreign husband has received protection in another country. These circumstances should be assessed consistently in two countries.

There are no objective reasons why the respective positions of two individuals should be viewed differently merely because they have applied for refugee status in two different democratic countries that respect human rights.

With this judgment, the General Assembly of CALL is trying to bring its case law in line with the M.S.S. judgment of the ECtHR.

The CALL set the conditions under which an appeal for suspension against an enforceable decision (an order to leave the territory) has automatic suspensive effect.

After a prima facie examination (in extreme urgency), the CALL decided that the applicant in this casehas a reasonable ground of appeal on the basis of Article 3 of the ECHR, as he gave sufficient indications of the concrete problems he was experiencing in Poland. The CALL derived from this a duty of investigation on the part of the Aliens Office. This was sufficient for the CALL, furthermore, to provisionally suspend enforcement of an agreement with Poland to take back the applicant, pending the processing of an appeal for revocation.

After the applicant absconded the time frame for a deportation was extended by 18 months and, therefore, Poland’s original acceptance was still valid at the time of the second application. Art 7 Dublin II Regulation is not applicable because the applicant’s family life was established after his first application for asylum. There is no violation of Art 8 ECHR because the applicant’s family life was formed at a moment when the applicant did not know whether he would be able to maintain it.

The right to family life can outweigh the ‘state responsibility’ criteria in the Dublin II Regulation. The Court held that the application for asylum should be processed in Sweden, in order to secure the right to family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights), despite the fact that another State was responsible under the Dublin II Regulation.

In a decision on whether the return of an unaccompanied minor to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation is unlawful in light of Art. 3 ECHR and therefore the sovereignty clause should be used, Art. 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU – best interest of the child as a primary consideration for authorities) is significant.

In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.

An expulsion order in relation to an elderly woman with a deteriorating medical condition gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 and Art 8 ECHR. In light of this risk, the Asylum Court held that the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation should be applied in combination with Article 15 of the same Regulation, even though the latter was not directly applicable in this case.

Art 3 and Art 15 Dublin Regulation are only applicable if there exist compelling reasons to believe the receiving country is incapable of welcoming asylum applicants in appropriate conditions or if the applicants can prove that they personally risk being subjected to ill treatment or not benefitting fully from an effective right to asylum. In this case, the applicants had not demonstrated they were personally victims of ill treatment in Poland. Poland was considered to offer sufficient guarantees against deportation and for an effective and impartial asylum procedure.

This was an appeal against the decision to deport an asylum applicant to Italy, when his brother had been admitted to the asylum procedure in France. The Council of State found that, under Art 9(2) Dublin Regulation, Italy was the responsible Member State. Art 8 did not apply as the definition of family members in Art 2(i) does not include siblings. Art 15 was not applicable since the applicant could apply for asylum in Italy. Only after Italy has made a decision the application would it be France's responsibility to decide whether to grant permission to enter and reside in France.