Case summaries
When a Dublin transfer does not take place within the six-month time limit prescribed in the Dublin III Regulation, responsibility for examining the application for international protection is automatically shifted to the Member State that requested the Dublin transfer. Moreover, the Court extends the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided in the Dublin III Regulation, specifying that an applicant for international protection can challenge a Dublin transfer before a national court by invoking the expiry of the prescribed six-month time limit.
The Dublin transfer of the applicant to Hungary will not violate Article 3 of the Convention.
This ruling concerned the determination of the Member State responsible when the Member State primarily designated as responsible according to the criteria in the Dublin II Regulation has systemic deficiencies leading to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker facing transfer there would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. It does not in itself mean that the determining Member State is required to examine the asylum application under Article 3(2) but must further examine the criteria under Chapter III of the Regulation.
During the refugee status proceedings, the administrative authorities should clarify on what grounds a foreign husband has received protection in another country. These circumstances should be assessed consistently in two countries.
There are no objective reasons why the respective positions of two individuals should be viewed differently merely because they have applied for refugee status in two different democratic countries that respect human rights.
A transfer to Greece within the framework of the Dublin Regulation was stopped due to the conditions for asylum seekers in the country.
In a decision on whether the return of an unaccompanied minor to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation is unlawful in light of Art. 3 ECHR and therefore the sovereignty clause should be used, Art. 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU – best interest of the child as a primary consideration for authorities) is significant.
This was an appeal against the decision by the Federal Asylum Office to transfer the first applicant to Poland and the second applicant, including their two children, to the Czech Republic. The Asylum Court allowed the appeal and found the consultations with other Member States and the decisions of the Federal Asylum Office to be arbitrary, ignoring national legislation requiring one procedure for the whole family and violating the Dublin II Regulation’s emphasis on the necessity of maintaining family unity as well as Article 8 of the ECHR.
The fact that Poland agreed to take charge of the asylum procedure of a whole family is, by itself, not a proper basis for an inadmissibility decision. The hierarchy of the criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the procedure on the merits, set out in Art 5(1) Dublin II Regulation, must be respected. In this case the husband and father of the family had already been admitted to the procedure on the merits and, therefore, Art 8 was applicable prior to Art 14.
This was an appeal against the decision to deport an asylum applicant to Italy, when his brother had been admitted to the asylum procedure in France. The Council of State found that, under Art 9(2) Dublin Regulation, Italy was the responsible Member State. Art 8 did not apply as the definition of family members in Art 2(i) does not include siblings. Art 15 was not applicable since the applicant could apply for asylum in Italy. Only after Italy has made a decision the application would it be France's responsibility to decide whether to grant permission to enter and reside in France.
Although the applicant, an adult without children, did not fall within the definition of a family member under Art 2(i) Dublin Regulation and could therefore not rely on Art 7 and Art 8 to defeat a transfer order, his links to family members in France could justify applying Art 3(2) or Art 15. In such a case, the definition of a family member should not be interpreted in the restrictive sense of Art 2(i). In order to apply a broader definition, the applicant must provide evidence of the intensity of the links to the family. In this case, the applicant failed to provide such evidence.