Case summaries
A renewed application for asylum in a second country is admissible if the nature of international protection applied for differs from the protection already granted. Deportation to the country of the first application or the country of origin is not to be taken into account in this situation.
When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.
The absence of an individual right of the applicant to challenge the determination of the State responsible to examine their asylum claim on Dublin II grounds does not prohibit the autonomous application of ECHR Article 8 to decisions to remove persons from one Member State to another. However, taking into account the significance of the Regulation and the need to preserve its effectiveness, an especially compelling case would have to be demonstrated to deny removal following a Dublin II decision. When the Secretary of State has certified such human rights claims as clearly unfounded, it must be shown that the same decision could have been reached on reasonable grounds by an immigration judge.
The provisions on responsibility for unaccompanied minors in Article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation are protective of the individual, as they not only govern relationships between Member States but (also) serve to protect fundamental rights.
Where there has been an unlawful rejection of an asylum application as inadmissible on grounds that another Member State is responsible under Section 27a of the German Asylum Act, this cannot be reinterpreted as a (negative) decision on a subsequent application under Section 71a of the Asylum Act, because of the different adverse legal consequences attached.
The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).
An application to establish the suspensive effect of a pending appeal pursuant to Section 80, Paragraph 5 of the German Code of Administrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung – VwGO) is not a legal remedy under Article 20, Paragraph 1 (d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”). A German court’s dismissal of a Section 80, Paragraph 5 application does therefore not suspend the 6-month deadline under Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Dublin II Regulation for a member state of the European Union (“Member State”) to transfer an applicant to a Member State that has accepted (actually or implicitly) a request to take charge.
A lack of attention paid to the vulnerability of the applicants as asylum seekers and children and their subsequent exposure to conditions of extreme poverty outside the State reception system has led to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The procedure of requesting the suspensive effect of a decision rejecting an asylum application and ordering the transfer of an applicant to another Member State does not amount to an effective remedy under the Convention.
The case concerns a removal from the United Kingdom to Sweden under the Dublin II Regulation. In the present case the court considered compatibility of Schedule 3 paragraph 3(2) of the Asylum and Immigration Act with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and whether the presumption that Sweden would comply with its international legal obligations was rebutted.
The presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and International Law obligations related to the reception and integration of asylum seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection has not been rebutted. Asylum seekers and BIPs suffering from severe psychological trauma can be returned to Italy with no real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR, or 4 CFREU, since the Country's reception capacities have not been exceeded, while effective medical treatment is available under the same terms as to Italian nationals.
Hungary’s practice of not suspending its deportation procedures for second time asylum applicants amounts to a serious and unlawful interference with an applicant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to apply for refugee status.