Case summaries
The applicant informed the authorities in Finland that he was a minor; however, he was registered as an adult in Malta. It was decided that the applicant must clarify and correct the information given to the authorities in Malta with respect to his age. Malta was deemed responsible for examining the applicant’s asylum claim under the Dublin II regulation even though he would have been considered a minor when applying for asylum in Finland.
The Constitutional Court allowed an appeal against a decision to expel a single mother and her three minor children to Greece. It is necessary that Greece ensure appropriate accommodation will be provided for vulnerable persons in each case. The applicants are vulnerable persons and the lack of assurance from Greece, therefore, gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR.
After the applicant absconded the time frame for a deportation was extended by 18 months and, therefore, Poland’s original acceptance was still valid at the time of the second application. Art 7 Dublin II Regulation is not applicable because the applicant’s family life was established after his first application for asylum. There is no violation of Art 8 ECHR because the applicant’s family life was formed at a moment when the applicant did not know whether he would be able to maintain it.
Although gender based persecution is not expressly mentioned among the reasons for recognising refugee status, the UNHCR Guidelines on claims to refugee status in cases involving gender based persecution, as cited by the Applicant, indicate that gender based persecution falls within the broader category of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group.
Although physical persons acting on their own behalf do not constitute typical perpetrators of persecution, they may be regarded as actors of persecution within the meaning of the Convention in cases where public authorities are unable or unwilling to protect an individual against their activities.
The right to family life can outweigh the ‘state responsibility’ criteria in the Dublin II Regulation. The Court held that the application for asylum should be processed in Sweden, in order to secure the right to family and private life (Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights), despite the fact that another State was responsible under the Dublin II Regulation.
The French authorities shall use the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation, under the judge’s supervision, when the rules that determine responsibility of a member state for the asylum procedure may infringe on international and national rights guaranteed to refugees and applicants for asylum. In this case a transfer order to Hungary, where the applicant had on two occasions been detained in unsuitable conditions, was held to be an unlawful infringement of the applicant’s right to asylum.
In this case, the Austrian Asylum Court held the decision of the Federal Asylum Office not to grant refugee status to the applicant’s child was a violation of Austrian asylum law since the child’s father had been granted refugee status. The Court also held a separation of the newborn child from its mother violates Art 8 ECHR and, therefore, the applicant’s asylum application has to be admitted to the procedure on the merits.
In a decision on whether the return of an unaccompanied minor to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation is unlawful in light of Art. 3 ECHR and therefore the sovereignty clause should be used, Art. 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU – best interest of the child as a primary consideration for authorities) is significant.
In this case the Council of State had to determine whether the evidence presented by the applicant in relation to his alleged absence from EU territory for more than 3 months was sufficient to apply Article 4(5) of the Dublin Regulation. The Council held such evidence should include not only proof of absence itself but also proof of the exit and entry dates in relation to the period of absence, which was missing in this case.
In the particular circumstances of the present case, the transfer of the asylum applicants to Greece would lead to a serious and manifestly illegal infringement of the right of asylum.