Case summaries
1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.
2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.
3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).
4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.
5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.
In the midst of the health crisis, the judge of liberty and detention of the Lille Judicial Tribunal considered that the health risk for the Applicant as well as for a third party, generated by the extension of the administrative detention was disproportionate to the perspectives of return. Especially since most countries had closed their borders.
As a result, the judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the Applicant’s detention.
The Judge of the liberty and detention of the Lyon Court of Appeal released the applicant based on the unavailability of the necessary medical care needed in his country of return.
The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention could mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since a non-suspensive appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.
As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.
The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention would mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since an appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.
As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.
A member state cannot rely on the fact that there are no specialized detention facilities in a part of its territory to justify keeping non-citizens in prison pending their removal.
In determining the lawfulness of continued detention after a breach of defence rights, the domestic authorities must ask whether, in light of all factual and legal circumstances, the outcome of the administrative procedure at issue could have been different if the third-country nationals in question had been able to put forward information which might show that their detention should be brought to an end.
In a situation of unlawful detention – unlawful because it did not comply with national and European norms on the detention of illegally staying citizens – as well as inhuman and degrading conditions in the Identification and Expulsion Centre, the revolt by the four Defendants should be considered as proportionate and the alleged conduct should be treated as legitimate defence.
When detained under conditions that constitute the notion of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of article 3 ECHR, a person is not criminally responsible for committing the unlawful act of escaping custody.
Restriction of movement due to the lack of official identification papers can occur only when the Applicant raises sufficient doubt as regards the credibility of his declared identity, at which the actual circumstances of the case at hand need to be taken into account.
The restriction of movement due to the presence of the Applicant’s fingerprints in the EURODAC base is permissible only if the actual circumstances of the case at hand indicate that the Applicant might flee.