Case summaries

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

The court ordered the Office of Immigration and Nationality to conduct new proceedings. The mere fact that national security risk factors arise vis-à-vis a person is not sufficient reason to exclude them from refugee or subsidiary protection status.

This cases concerns the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive in a case where the two Applicants are Pakistani nationals who are members of the Ahmadi religious community and fear persecution there on the basis of religion.

The situation in Somalia, in particular in the South and Central regions, should be regarded as a situation of generalised violence resulting from an internal armed conflict.  

The notion of “well-founded fear” has not been precisely defined. However, it is commonly accepted that it must necessarily contain two elements: a subjective element (the party has a real and credible fear of persecution) and an objective element (this fear has a basis in reality).  A person applying for refugee status should present facts and possibly evidence confirming that they were persecuted in the past or that they fear persecution upon returning to their country of origin. Other reasons for a foreigner leaving their country of origin or fearing a return to their country of origin are immaterial as regards recognition of their refugee status.

A social group is not formed by those of whom it consists, or even by the objective existence of characteristics ascribed to them, but by the way in which surrounding society or institutions regard them. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to reject the appellant’s administrative appeal against the denial of his application for refugee status. 

The appellant is a Columbian national and claims to fear political persecution if he is returned to his country because of threats from the FARC group (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) due to the appellant’s refusal to permit two of his sons to join the armed group.

 The Supreme Court rejects the appeal, affirming the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejects the appeal for protection on the grounds of humanitarian considerations as contained in Spanish Law.   

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

Instead of rejecting the application, the Court granted subsidiary protection status to the single female Applicant and her minor children, as their return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (indiscriminate violence).