Case summaries

Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).

The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly." 

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary). 

The Returns Directive does not preclude domestic legislation which provides for a prison sentence as a criminal law penalty for non-EU citizens who unlawfully re-enter the country in breach of an entry ban.

The applicant did not have the possibility to have his allegations (which also supported his subsequent application)  duly taken into consideration. His written answers to the questions asked by the administrative authorities on his subsequent application were not documented with precision. His allegations need to be examined and evaluated further.

Whilst the Appeals Committee believes that the applicant was ‘wronged’ during the administrative procedures in the First and Second Degree (pursuant to Decree 113/2013), the Committee is unable to request a new personal interview, because no such provision exists within the national legislation (Regulation Service of Authority and Appeal 339/2013 opinion of the Legal Council).

The Austrian asylum authorities have to consider every possible breach of Art. 3 ECHR (or Art. 4 CFREU respectively) when examining a Dublin transfer. A possible breach can be linked to personal circumstances of the asylum seeker and does not necessarily have to be caused by a systemic failure of the asylum system in the receiving country. A Dublin transfer is forbidden if there is a real risk of a breach of Art. 3 ECHR.

A single mother and her five minor children must be considered as particularly vulnerable and cannot be transferred from Austria to Hungary.

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State prevails over the public’s interest in deporting the Applicant to the Member State in which the Applicant first sought asylum if there is a predominant degree of likelihood that the Applicant will be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the other Member State (e.g. because of significant capacity problems and a change to its asylum law).

The obligations imposed by Article 3 ECHR do not prevent contracting states from taking into account the possibility of relocation. Where appropriate, contracting states can expect an applicant to relocate to another part of his country of origin in order to avoid persecution.

If an appellant provides substantiated reasons that call into question the consideration of evidence in the administrative proceedings, the facts cannot be regarded as “well established on basis of the records in combination with the complaint”. Thus, an oral hearing has to be held. The same applies if there is a necessity to consider up-to-date country of origin information as well as an up-to-date medical report due to the long duration of the judicial proceedings.

In the opinion of the court, the absence of a legal representative in the oral hearing, in spite of an explicit request by the appellant, does not constitute a grave violation of procedural rules. The relevant provisions does not provide for any legal consequences for such failure to act. However, this interpretation is not mandatory due to the lack of explicitly regulated legal consequences and requires further clarification by the Supreme Administrative Court. 

Tigere (T) appealed against a decision that the legislation which prevented her from obtaining a student loan was compatible with her human right to education under Article 2 Protocol 1 and Article 14 ECHR. To qualify for a loan, the legislation specified that a student had to (a) be settled (i.e. not subject to immigration laws/restrictions) in the UK when the academic year began; (b) be ordinarily resident in England; (c) been ordinarily resident (i.e. “lawfully”) in the UK for the three years before the start of the course; and (d) their residence in the UK under ‘(c)’ was not at any point for full-time education. T was judged not to have met criteria (a) and (c).