Case summaries

The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.

The case concerns seven Venezuelan nationals who arrived in Curaçao in April 2019 and were placed in immigration detention following refusal of entry and removal orders. The Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR in relation to the use of force during their detention, the absence of an effective and independent investigation and the lack of justification for the use of rubber bullets against applicants in custody. It further found a violation of Article 5 § 4 ECHR, due to the lack of access to a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of their detention, particularly due to the lack of accessible remedies, language barriers, and absence of effective legal assistance. 

The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.

Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.

Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.

Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.

Regarding the return of a Turkish applicant from Greece to Türkiye, her account constituted a prima facie case of refoulement, shifting the burden of proof to the Greek Government after evidentiary standards from secret detention cases were applied. The return of the applicant without any individual assessment or access to remedies, despite her asylum request and risk of ill-treatment due to alleged links to opposition movements in Türkiye, amounts to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.

The applicant’s unregistered detention at a border guard station, without legal basis, information on the reasons for her arrest, or access to judicial review, as part of a broader Greek pattern of unlawful returns, amounts to a violation of Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ECHR. Although the applicant failed to prove a real risk to life or inhuman or degrading treatment during her removal process – where she travelled by an inflatable boat with other migrants –, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge such risks amounts to a violation of Article 13 ECHR.

Complaint under Article 3 ECHR concerning the conditions of detention of a Turkish national in the Czech Bělá-Jezová detention centre declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Failure to conduct an independent, thorough and victim-accessible investigation into allegations of police ill-treatment at Prague Airport amounts to a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 ECHR. Alleged ill-treatment by police officers does not amount to a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 ECHR, as the ECtHR cannot establish beyond reasonable doubt that the force used, including pepper spray, was excessive.

The CJEU found that national legislation cannot introduce a new inadmissibility ground for applications for international protection that is not already included in the list of inadmissibility grounds in Directive 2013/32. In addition, the CJEU ruled that the so-called “Stop Soros” law which aimed at restricting and criminalizing persons or organizations providing assistance to applicants for international protection also breached EU law.

The Court found no violation of the Convention given that the applicants would have had access to a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion had  they entered lawfully into Spain – they did not have any “cogent reasons” for not using the border procedures available at designated entry points. As such, the lack of an individualised procedure for their removal was the consequence of their own conduct.

NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.

The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. 

The case dealt primarily with the standard of reasoning required in credibility assessment among other issues (travel findings and best interests of the child). In quashing the RAT decision, the High Court ruled that the RAT had not met the standard of reasoning required in assessment of the credibility of oral testimony (as established in the jurisprudence of the Court and EU law), reiterating the obligation upon the decision maker to ensure that each negative credibility finding is accompanied by an adequate rationale clearly outlining the reasons for such findings.

By not considering country information submitted by the applicant, the Slovenian Migration Office did not establish all relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it. The Office had not clearly and precisely explained which reasons it considered as decisive in determining that the degree of indiscriminate violence in the applicant’s country of origin did not reach such a level that the applicant would be subjected to a serious and individual threat to his life or person in the event of return to his country of origin.