Case summaries
Article 8 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides for a subjective right to family reunification, both for the applicant himself and for the family members present in the Member State responsible. This right is also justiciable to the extent that denial of transfer affects the rights to family unity and the best interest of an unaccompanied minor.
The expiry of the time limit for the submission of a take charge request pursuant to Article 21 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation, as well as for the submission of a request to review the rejection of a take charge request (so-called "remonstration") pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Implementing Regulation to the Dublin II Regulation, does not reverse the responsibility back to the requesting Member State if the failure to comply with the time limit cannot be attributed to the applicant and family unity and the best interests of the child take precedence over the procedural rules on time limits.
Due to the paramount importance of the right to family unit and the best interests of the child, the discretion under Article 17(2) of the Dublin III Regulation translates into a legal obligation of the Member State to invoke the sovereignty clause where there are close family ties. Beyond such family ties, no further special relationship or interdependency is required.
Whether a minor is "unaccompanied" within the meaning of Article 2 lit. j of the Dublin III Regulation depends on the domestic law in the Member State where the minor is present.
Requests for family reunification must be examined even if the third-country national, who is a family member of an EU citizen who has never exercised his right of freedom of movement, is subject to an entry ban. Whether there is a relationship of dependency between the third-country national and the EU citizen and whether public policy grounds justify the entry ban must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
An asylum applicant who is below the age of 18 at the time of his or her entry into the territory of a Member State and of the introduction of his or her asylum application in that State, but who, in the course of the asylum procedure, attains the age of majority and is thereafter granted refugee status must still be regarded as a “minor” for the purposes of that provision.
The reduction in the financial allowance available to child dependants of asylum seekers was not contrary to the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.
1. Do the ‘international obligations’, referred to in Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 1 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas cover all the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including, in particular, those guaranteed by Articles 4 and 18, and do they also cover obligations which bind the Member States, in the light of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees?
A. In view of the answer given to the first question, must Article 25(1)(a) of Regulation No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas be interpreted as meaning that, subject to its discretion with regard to the circumstances of the case, a Member State to which an application for a visa with limited territorial validity has been made is required to issue the visa applied for, where a risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or another international obligation by which it is bound is detected?
B. Does the existence of links between the applicant and the Member State to which the visa application has been made (for example, family connections, host families, guarantors and sponsors) affect the answer to that question?
The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.
The provisions on responsibility for unaccompanied minors in Article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation are protective of the individual, as they not only govern relationships between Member States but (also) serve to protect fundamental rights.
Where there has been an unlawful rejection of an asylum application as inadmissible on grounds that another Member State is responsible under Section 27a of the German Asylum Act, this cannot be reinterpreted as a (negative) decision on a subsequent application under Section 71a of the Asylum Act, because of the different adverse legal consequences attached.
The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).
When balancing the applicant’s right to family reunification and the protection of the rights of others in relation to the welfare of the state, which would be lessened if the application for family reunification were approved, the Supreme Court favours the latter since according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, countries enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when protecting the right to family life.
Non-Citizen children of the State have rights protected by the Constitution when in the State, including rights under Article 41, 42 and 40.3. However, the right to reside in the State is a protection under Article 40.3 which is reserved for Irish citizen children. It is the citizenship of the child that confers this right to live in the State under Article 40.3.
The best interests of the child are considerations that must be assessed when deciding upon a deportation order for a child. However, as the Convention on the Rights of Child has been ratified by Ireland but has not been implemented as part of domestic law, the Court is not bound to view the best interests of the child as the primary consideration.