Case summaries
The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.
The Federal Administrative Court found that Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive does not hinder Member States to allow parents and siblings, fulfilling the requirements for family members under Art. 2(j) of the Directive, to change their status of subsidiary protection into a refugee status which they derive from their minor sponsor.
The Court of Justice held that Directive 2011/95 does not preclude a Member State from granting refugee status to a minor through one of his parents, even though there is no risk of persecution in case of removal to his country of nationality (Tunisia).
The Court decides that the relevant point in time to assess the ‘minor’ status of a beneficiary of international protection under the Qualification Directive is the date on which the applicant makes an (informal) application for international protection.
The Court decides that the notion of ‘family member’ under the Qualification Directive does not require an actual resumption of family life between the parent who benefited international protection and the child. Furthermore, the rights of a family member to claim the benefits under the Qualification Directive persist after the beneficiary of subsidiary protection reaches the age of majority, for the duration of the period of validity of the residence permit granted to them.
Member States are required to take due account of the best interests of the child before adopting a return decision accompanied by an entry ban, even where the person to whom that decision is addressed is not a minor but his or her father.
The Dutch Council of State does not consider ‘the best interest of the child’-criteriοn automatically fulfilled, in the context of a Dublin transfer, when an unaccompanied minor can be transferred to an adult family member in another MS. In turn, it considers that the authorities have to substantially and individually investigate whether the best interest of the child is respected when transferring.
A Guinean woman who has been forced into marriage at a young age and subsequently harassed into marrying her late husband’s brother, is a refugee under article 1, section A §2 of the Geneva Convention. She risks being persecuted by reason of her membership in the social group of women, and considering the regular violation of women’s rights occuring in Guinea.
The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9. To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.
The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.
Article 11(2) of Directive 2003/86 must be interpreted as precluding the rejection of an application for family reunification lodged by a sponsor in favour of a minor of whom she is allegedly the guardian solely on the grounds of lack of official documentary evidence of the family relationship and the sponsor’s inability to explain the absence of such evidence being deemed implausible on the basis of general country of origin information.
Authorities have to take into consideration the specific circumstances of the sponsor and the minor, including the difficulties they faced during and after their flight from their country.