Case summaries

A arrived in Finland via four transit countries using forged travel documents. When he/she was caught he/she applied for asylum in Finland. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that Article 31(3) of the Geneva Convention on Refugees prevented A from being persecuted for the crime of fraud.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the Appellant against the High National Court’s judgment to uphold the Ministry of the Interior's decision to deny asylum. The Appellant is of Sahrawi origin. In the application he claims that one day the Moroccan police forces began to dismantle the Gdeim Izik (El Aaiun) camp, where the Applicant was living, violently suppressing the Sahrawi people who were there.

The appeal progressed because the denial was agreed via an accelerated procedure – similar to a “dismissal” – using Article 21.2o of Act 12/2009 (when someone alleges contradictory, implausible or insufficient infomation, or information that contradicts verified knowledge about the country of origin, clearly showing that their application is unfounded).

 The Supreme Court maintained that although this is classed as a “refusal” (“denegación”), in actual fact it has the scant guarantees of “inadmissibility”:  the application was rejected without having been fully analysed by the Interministerial Asylum and Refugee Commission or via an urgent procedure.

Referring specifically to the asylum procedures directive, the Council of State examines the external and internal legality of the French list of safe countries of origin and decides to take Bangladesh off the list.

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.

This case concerned the legality of a circular in French law which was challenged by two organisations on the basis that it was contrary to EU Law under the Reception Conditions Directive in so far as it excludes asylum seekers from entitlement to allowances if they are in the Dublin procedure in France. The CJEU held that the Reception Conditions Directive applies in such a scenario and therefore asylum seekers in the Dublin procedure should have access to the minimum reception conditions laid down in that Directive. This obligation ceases when the person is actually transferred to another Member State.

1. The expulsion of a recognised refugee may only take place subject to the requirements of Article 21 (3) in conjunction with (2) and Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive.

2. Compelling grounds for public security or order according to Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive do not presuppose any outstanding acts of extraordinary danger in support of international terrorism; neither does specific involvement of a sympathiser suffice unless it is characterised by a large degree of continuity and as such shapes and influences the environment of the terrorist organisation. 

A Russian Federation citizen arrived in Finland from another EU country (Lithuania) where he/she alleged that he/she had been persecuted and claimed international protection on this basis. The Immigration Service denied the Applicant a residence permit, failed to examine the application for international protection and decided to deport him/her to Lithuania. The Immigration Service considered Lithuania to be a safe third country and the application for international protection was not examined in relation to his/her country of origin.  The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the issue of international protection could not be dealt with in Lithuania as the grounds for the application were cited as persecution in that same country.  The Administrative Court was ordered  to overturn the Immigration Service’s decision and return the case back for further consideration.

Although the asylum seeker has been unable to offer any credible account of the death penalty allegedly imposed on him due to his homosexuality, it must nevertheless be assessed whether, he has grounds to fear persecution or is in real danger of suffering serious harm in his home country due to his sexual orientation, and what weight must be given to the fact that he must hide his homosexuality to avoid this kind of threat. The judgments of the Administrative Court and the Immigration Service were overturned and the case was returned to the Immigration Service for further consideration. 

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application.