Case summaries

Failure to integrate into the country, which is typically the case, does not constitute grounds for protection. Behaviour a long time previously in relation to the entry is not significant when assessing security requirements. Aggressive behaviour in the Federal Support Centre does not alone represent a need for security which justifies detention (deportation detention). Despite removal from the Federal Support Centre owing to this behaviour, this must not lead to an asylum seeker losing his entitlement to basic services.

This case concerned the appropriate interpretation to be given to the determination of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/2012, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in answer to the questions posed by the High Court of Ireland pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

The Court of Justice answered in the negative the question posed that the duty to cooperate required the decision maker to supply the Applicant with a draft of any possible adverse decision for comment prior to its formal adoption.

However, the Court of Justice also considered the Irish system for protection decision making more broadly and concluded that it was unlawful not to allow for a further hearing of the Applicant in the course of examination of the subsidiary protection application – following the conclusion of a negative decision on an asylum claim.

The High Court held that the appropriate interpretation to be given to the judgment in this regard was that, in order for a hearing to be effective, it would at a minimum, involve a procedure whereby the Applicant was invited to comment on any adverse credibility findings made at the asylum stage; a completely fresh opportunity to revisit all matters bearing on the claim for subsidiary protection; and a completely fresh assessment of the Applicant's credibility in circumstances where the mere fact that the asylum decision maker had ruled adversely on this question would not in itself suffice or be directly relevant to this fresh credibility assessment.

The Court opined that the finding of the Court of Justice did not suggest that an oral hearing would be routinely required at subsidiary protection stage, but considered it unnecessary at that juncture to conclusively determine the issue.

The right to pocket money for an asylum seeker whose placement in a private address is permitted by the Migration Office because of justified reasons is part of the right to dignity. Legislation depriving a person of this right is not in line with the Constitution. 

Rules on rights of applicants for international protection (Governmental Decree, Official Gazette no.64/14) determining that financial aid for asylum seekers placed in a private address is to be decreased by 50% might endanger the applicant’s right to human dignity. 

Transferring the major part of the investigations into the facts of an asylum application to the Court of Second Instance impedes the purpose of an appeal stage. As a specialist authority, the Federal Asylum Agency is obliged to keep up to date with relevant developments under asylum law. Both the departure clause reasons and previous acts of persecution are to be taken into consideration in a decision. With regard to Pakistani members of the Ahmadiyya religious community, the decision by the CJEU in C-71/11 and C-99/11, Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z and the right to practise religion in public are to be taken into account.

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

The right to family reunification involving Union citizens who are minor children living with their mothers, who are third country nationals, in the territory of the Member State of which the children are nationals and changes in the composition of the families following the mothers’ remarriage to third country nationals and the birth of children of those marriages who are also third country nationals. The case involves the right to respect for family life and how to take into consideration the children’s best interests.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.

The Applicants are not members of a particular social group as defined by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as neither their statements, nor the generally available information would indicate that Serbia considers their citizens originating from Kosovo as a particular group with specific characteristics.

Relying upon the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to ECHR, Article 3 and the decision of the Constitutional Court Up-96/09, as referred to by the court of first instance, the Supreme Court ruled that minimal social and economic protection for an individual who is dependent on state aid does not represent a violation of dignity and therefore does not provide sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. Poor socio-economic conditions, in which the majority of inhabitants of an individual country have found themselves, do not represent sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. 

This case concerns the interpretation and application of Article 15 of the Dublin Regulation, commonly known as the humanitarian clause, in a specific set of circumstances where the asylum seeker concerned has a daughter in law who is seriously ill, and on account of cultural factors, at risk or has grandchildren below the age of majority, who, as a result of the daughter-in-law’s illness are in need of care and the asylum seeker concerned is both willing and able to support them. The CJEU held in circumstances such as those Article 15(2) must be interpreted so as to make that Member State responsible for the asylum seekers claim. This is applicable even if the Member State which was responsible pursuant to the criteria laid down in Chapter III of the Regulation did not make that request.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.