Case summaries
In the opinion of the appeal court, the fact that the defendant disregarded the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his request for an application of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, and omitted to present an argument in the decision as to why it had not upheld the application, fails to satisfy the requirements of the generally accepted legal principles of administrative procedure, because the outcomes of these actions were not assessed and justified in the decision.
The case considered whether the security situation in central-Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, met the prerequisites for granting a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. It was confirmed that the need for international protection must be evaluated not only on points of law but also on points of fact. Both the applicant’s account of prior events in the country of origin, as well as current country of origin information regarding the security situation, must be taken into account in the risk assessment. As such, the evaluation is tied to a particular individual and to a particular time and place.
Country of origin information can verify a situation in which the risk of persecution can exceptionally be considered to be proved without substantiating the personal circumstances of the applicant. The danger of the harm is real, and complies with the requirements of subsidiary protection.
This case concerned the disproportionate delay in processing the applicant’s claim for asylum on appeal. The applicant was informed that it would take eighteen months for his case to be heard. He lodged an appeal before the Constitutional Court (as a last resort) claiming the right to due process constitutionally guaranteed under Art 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution to enjoy legal process without undue delay.
The applicant’s claim for refugee status was rejected as Convention grounds were not established, however, subsidiary protection was granted in the alternative by the court on the basis of grave human rights violations and the prohibition of torture (Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).
The court accepted the argument that by granting a lower protection status (tolerated status), even if the applicant qualifies for subsidiary protection, the asylum authority violates Art 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (Art 61 (b) and (c) of the Asylum Act)
The Court considered how to assess whether an applicant’s activities for insurgent groups in Afghanistan could constitute terrorism. It further considered whether attacks upon United Nations Security Council mandated forces, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, were acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, justifying exclusion from the 1951 Refugee Convention under Article 1F(c).
A transfer to Greece within the framework of the Dublin Regulation was stopped due to the conditions for asylum seekers in the country.
When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country.
For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.
Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.
Refugee status was granted as the applicant was deemed at risk of persecution due to his homosexuality. The court found that homosexuals constitute a particular social group in Cameroon according to Section 60 (1) of the Residence Act / Art 10.1 (d) of the Qualification Directive. According to the Qualification Directive, sexual orientation does not only constitute an unchangeable characteristic, but is so fundamental to the identity of a person that he/she should not be forced to denounce it. That means that under the Qualification Directive it is no longer important if the applicant can persevere with abstinence in the long term. The punishment which the applicant would face due to homosexual acts in case of return does not simply constitute criminal prosecution, but is persecution in terms of Section 60 (1) Residence Act.