Case summaries
This was an appeal against the rejection of an application for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 and 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010; and against the Minister for Citizen Protection's decisions 5401/3-498356 dated 11.2.2011 and 4000/1/67-f dated 18.5.2011. The rejection of the application (and the legal consequences arising from the rejection) was an excusable error, due to the body issuing the decision having adopted misguided practices. The fear of persecution was based on membership of a particular social group. The domestic violence endured by the Applicant in the form of psychological stress and physical violence at the hands of her husband, in conjunction with the absence of State protection, constitutes a type of gender based persecution because those actions are detrimental to human dignity and physical integrity. Similarly, her non-conformist behaviour meant that she was exposed to the State's strict laws and practices which imposed disproportionately harsh punishment on women accused of having sexual relations outside marriage.
It was held that the implementation of laws (which may be derived from traditional or cultural norms and practices such as Sharia) which conflict with international human rights standards, and also the disproportionately harsh punishment imposed for non-compliance with a policy or for violation of a law (punishment, indeed, which shows gender based discrimination) could constitute persecution.
The imposition of corporal punishment by judicial and administrative authorities is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Applicant's disproportionately harsh punishment by whipping or even stoning is considered to be torture and constitutes a serious form of persecution since the right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is a protected right which is not subject to any exceptions. The prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture) is absolute, and a grave violation of absolute rights is, undeniably, persecution.
The importance of preserving family unity is emphasised, taking into consideration the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Preamble to Directive 2004/83/EC.
The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.
A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.
A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.
Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.
The Constitutional Court did not unreservedly uphold the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Appellant in the case sought protection of his rights under Article 3 of the ECHR (and fundamental rights under Article 16(2) of the Constitution), which, in comparison with the other human rights and fundamental freedoms defined in the Convention, is characterised by an absolute and collective guarantee. In view of this, the Constitutional Court found that the standards of protection arising from Article 3 of the Convention (and Article 16(2) of the Constitution) should have been applied in the proceedings, even if such an obligation is not explicitly set out in the legislation, because these secure a greater range of constitutional rights and freedoms within the meaning of Article 154c(1) of the Constitution, and therefore take precedence over the law.
A stateless Kurd from Syria was not recognised as a refugee. The court held:
- The denial of re-entry of stateless Kurds is not to be considered political persecution because a general institutional practice cannot be detected which is aimed against ethnic Kurds in a manner that is relevant to asylum grounds (Art 10 of the Qualification Directive).
- Whether the legal practice of Syrian legislation on citizenship and the denial of re-entry are part of a restrictive policy towards Kurds, and support the aims of the State of Syria in respect of its settlement policy, is not important when determining political persecution under Section 60 (1) sentence (5) of the Residence Act in connection with Art. 9 and 10 Qualification Directive.
Restriction of the right to attend church is an act of persecution and therefore a violation of Art 10 of the Qualification Directive.
The Respondent concluded that the Appellant represents a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic, although there was no information in the administrative file on the basis of which it might reach such a conclusion (valid premise). It is thus a clear case of the findings of fact (that the Appellant represents a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic) being in conflict with the contents of the file. Such a situation constitutes a ground for setting aside a contested decision under the provisions of Section 250j(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.
If the Respondent had information on the basis of which it reached a valid premise, according to which the Appellant represents a danger to the security of the Slovak Republic, this must exist in a form (usually written) which enables the parties to the proceedings, their representatives or the reviewing authority to acquaint themselves with the contents thereof. If, however, the Respondent, despite the existence of this information, failed to place it in the administrative file, the file must be regarded as incomplete, which constitutes a ground for setting aside a contested decision under the provisions of Section 250j(3) of the Civil Procedure Code.
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) returned the case to the Administrative Court for reconsideration based on the applicants' change of circumstance (conversion to Christianity in Finland) which only became apparent during the appeal before the SAC.
This case considered exclusion from refugee status and found that criminal proceedings are not required for the application of Art 12.2 of the Qualification Directive or Art 1F of the Refugee Convention.
The applicant came from a district in Afghanistan, which according to up-to-date country of origin information, also contained areas judged as being safe. When considering internal protection for subsidiary forms of international protection, the decision maker must also consider whether or not the applicant is able to reach these areas safely. The roads could not be considered safe and the other presented routes were also not considered feasible for the applicant. As the applicant could not resort to internal protection elsewhere, he was granted a residence permit on the grounds of humanitarian protection in accordance with section 88 a § of the Aliens’ Act.