Case summaries
This case examines the refusal to grant international protection status to a physically disabled, single Egyptian woman. The OIN failed to provide clear, detailed reasoning why the Applicant did not meet the legal conditions to acquire subsidiary protection status in Hungary.
The Metropolitan Court of Public Administration and Labour granted subsidiary protection status to the Applicant and concluded that based on cumulative grounds the Applicant would be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if she returned to Egypt.
In this judgement, the Court held that there was a violation of article 3 of the Convention concerning the detention conditions of the applicant at the premises of the executive subcommittee of the Thessaloniki foreign police. There was also a violation of article 5 para 1 (f) concerning the duration of his detention and para 4 with regards to the judicial review of his detention.
The Court found that there would be no violation of Article 3 in the event of return of the applicant, who suffered from chronic kidney failure and was in need of dialysis three times per week, to Kyrgyzstan.
The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.
The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.
The Supreme Court held that the National High Court of Spain (Audiencia Nacional) erred in annulling the General Deputy Director of Asylum’s decision to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection because the National High Court of Spain failed to consider the substance of the Appellant’s request for asylum.
The Supreme Court declared that the National High Court erred when annulling the decision of the General Sub-Directorate for Asylum (Ministry of Interior) to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection. The National High Court annulled the decision but did not consider the Appellant’s core claim: the request for international protection.
As the National High Court was in possession of all necessary facts required to decide on the substance of the request by the Appellant for international protection, it should have been able to determine as such. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal.
Even after the introduction of Art. 3 (3) AsylG, the previous legal practice with regard to persons who justify their asylum application by refusing military service or desertion in their home country continues to be valid. Accordingly, a conscientious objection to military service or desertion cannot establish refugee status on its own, only if it is associated with persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG.
The case concerns an expulsion order from Romanian territory issued against a Turkish applicant, and his placement in an administrative detention centre
The Court found that there was no violation of article 5(4) ECHR as the applicant had been given the opportunity to challenge the legality of his detention
However, it found that article 5(1)f) ECHR had been violated as the applicant had been detained for a further three months after the rejection of his asylum claim.
The State is obliged to adopt legislation which allows the refugee to actually exercise the right to respect for family life in its territory. Under Article 53(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia the scope of family life firstly includes the nuclear family and secondly, where specific factual circumstances dictate, members of the family who are not nuclear but who are similar or perform the same function.
The legislator limited the right to family reunification by enacting an exhaustive definition of eligible family members for reunification, excluding any other form of family unity. According to the Constitutional Court, the legislator disproportionately restricted the right of refugees to respect for family life and violated the right of the appellant under the Article 53(3) of the Constitution.
The court found that the removal of a Somali applicant to Italy under the Dublin Regulation would not result in a violation of article 3of the Convention and would not entail any violation of the rights set in article 1, 2, 5, 6 and 13.