Case summaries

Following the decision of Abdulla et al. (C-175/08) of the European Court of Justice, revocation of refugee status presupposes that a significant and non-temporary change of circumstances has taken place. This is the case if the factors which formed the basis of the recognition of refugee status, may be regarded as having been permanently eradicated. The relevant standard of probability for the determination of the likelihood of future persecution is the same both for the recognition and the revocation of refugee status, i.e. a change in circumstances has to be assessed on the basis of whether there is still a "considerable" probability of persecution (change from former case law).

In applying Art 12 of the Qualification Directive concerning exclusion from refugee status, the decision-maker is required to conduct an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and, specifically, of his own complicity, if any, in crimes against humanity.

Prostitutes who come from the State of Edo, and who are both victims of human trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks, form a group whose members are, by reason of these two common characteristics which define them, likely to be subjected to persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, without being able to avail themselves of the protection of the Nigerian authorities. They are members of a particular social group.

Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered. 

The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.

A claim based on past persecution was rejected on the basis that it lacked credibility. A challenge to the decision of the Tribunal was successful on the basis that the decision did not contain any reasoned assessment of the prospective risk of future persecution if returned to Sudan. The High Court in its judgment cautioned against the use of case law as a source of country of origin information.

This case considered exclusion from refugee status and found that criminal proceedings are not required for the application of Art 12.2 of the Qualification Directive or Art 1F of the Refugee Convention.

For the exclusion ground of war crimes or crimes against humanity to be applicable it is not necessary to establish to the point of utmost certainty that a refugee has committed such crimes, it is sufficient if serious reasons justify this assumption.  A revocation of refugee status is also possible if war crimes or crimes against humanity have been committed after refugee status was granted.

The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.